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A THIRD THEORY OF PATERNALISM
Nicolas Cornell*
This Article examines the normative significance of paternalism. That an ac-
tion, a law, or a policy is paternalistic generally counts against it. This Article
considers three reasons why this might be so—that is, three theories about
what gives paternalism its normative character.
This Article’s claim is that the two most common explanations for paternal-
ism’s negative character are mistaken. The first view, which underlies the re-
cent work by Professors Thaler and Sunstein, maintains that paternalism is
negatively charged because it involves coercive interference with people’s
choices. This approach proves inadequate, however, because more coercive ac-
tions can be a less objectionable form of paternalism, and vice versa. Paternal-
ism’s impermissibility varies independently from its coerciveness. The second
common theory of paternalism focuses on the distinctive intention behind pa-
ternalistic interference. But this approach is ill suited to explain the normative
significance of paternalism because permissibility is not generally dependent
on intention.
This Article sketches a third conception of paternalism—one that locates its
normative significance in neither coercion nor motive. This approach main-
tains that paternalism involves expressive content. Paternalism expresses the
idea that the actor knows better than the person acted upon; it implies that the
other party is not capable of making good judgments for herself. The norma-
tive significance of paternalism derives from the typical impermissibility of
making such an expression. That is, paternalism is wrong in the same way
that an insult is wrong. This understanding of paternalism’s normative signif-
icance provides the tools to make the charge of paternalism leveled against
some policies intelligible, and conversely to explain why other paternalistic
policies are permissible.
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Introduction
Paternalism is widely understood to have a negative connotation. Pro-
posed laws—on topics ranging from seat belts1 to sodas2 to health insur-
ance3—are frequently criticized on the grounds that they are paternalistic.
Those defending criticized laws or policies often respond by developing
nonpaternalistic justifications for the proposed policies.4 Both sides of the
political aisle routinely characterize the other side as paternalistic.5 In short,
paternalism carries a very negative connotation in legal and public policy
discourse.
1. Compulsory seat belt laws are the classic example of paternalistic legislation. For an
early discussion of this example, see Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 Monist 64 (1972).
2. Mayor Bloomberg’s proposed ban on large soft drinks has been one of several high-
profile contexts in which paternalism has been debated recently. E.g., Bettina Elias Siegel, New
York Mayor Bloomberg v Big Soda, Guardian (May 31, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/31/new-york-mayor-bloomberg-v-big-soda
(“[F]orbidding people outright to buy the size of soda they desire strikes me as quite paternal-
istic and intrusive and . . . likely to fuel resentment.”).
3. The Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate and requirements for existing plans
have been heavily criticized as paternalism run amok. E.g., Charles Krauthammer, Opinion,
Obamacare Laid Bare, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-obamacare-laid-bare/2013/10/31/d229515a-
4254-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html (“Beyond mendacity, there is liberal paternalism,
of which . . . forced cancellations [of insurance policies] are a classic case. . . . Sure, you freely
chose the policy, paid for the policy, renewed the policy, liked the policy. But you’re too
primitive to know what you need. We do. Your policy is hereby canceled.”).
4. E.g., Simon Rippon, Imposing Options on People in Poverty: The Harm of a Live Donor
Organ Market, 40 J. Med. Ethics 145 (2014) (developing a nonpaternalistic justification for
prohibiting organ sales); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and
Accommodation, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205 (2000) (developing a nonpaternalistic account of
the unconscionability doctrine).
5. See, e.g., Jessica Valenti, Editorial, A War on Women: Latest Paternalistic Efforts to
Control Female Sexuality Are Part of a Long Pattern, Balt. Sun, Feb. 29, 2012, at 17A, available
at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-28/news/bs-ed-war-on-women-20120228_1_dem
ocratic-women-republicans-contraception; Meghashyam Mali, Paul Ryan: Obama Contracep-
tion Ruling Reveals ‘Paternalistic, Arrogant’ Attitude, The Hill (Feb. 19, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://
thehill.com/policy/healthcare/211579-paul-ryan-obama-contraception-ruling-reveals-paternal
istic-arrogant-attitude.
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This Article attempts to answer the question: What’s wrong with pater-
nalism? This isn’t a rhetorical question meant to prompt reconsideration of
whether paternalism is wrong. This Article takes as a starting point the as-
sumption that paternalism is, at least generally, something to be avoided.
This is not to say that paternalism is always wrong. But the fact that an
action, law, or policy would count as paternalistic is at least a prima facie
reason against adopting it—if a paternalistic action, law, or policy is permis-
sible, it is permissible only in spite of its paternalism. The aim of this Article
is to explore why paternalism is, in general, a bad thing. The answer to this
question is important because it will inform when and to what extent a law
or policy’s paternalism should count against its adoption.
This Article considers three answers to this question—that is, three the-
ories about what makes something paternalistic and what gives paternalism
its normative character. The central thesis is that the two most common
explanations for paternalism’s character are mistaken. While philosophers
and legal scholars have devoted a great deal of thought to the topic of pater-
nalism, they have almost always focused on two elements: coercion and in-
tent. What is wrong with paternalism, the common wisdom says, is either its
use of coercion or the impermissible intentions behind it. According to these
theories, paternalism is wrong because it prevents us from making our own
choices, or because it intends to prevent us from making our own choices.
This Article sketches a third conception of paternalism—one that lo-
cates the normative significance of paternalism in neither coercion nor in-
tention. The third—and I believe correct—theory holds that instances of
paternalism are objectionable because of their expressive content. Paternal-
ism is suspect because it implies that the other party is not capable of mak-
ing good judgments for herself. While it is sometimes noted that paternalism
is insulting, some other characteristic is usually taken to explain paternal-
ism’s impermissibility. The expressive account rejects this move. According
to the expressive view, paternalism is objectionable because it constitutes an
insult, and that is all that needs to be said. Focusing on the expressive con-
tent allows us to make sense of certain charges of paternalism and also to see
where those charges are inappropriate. In particular, it highlights the way
that paternalism’s permissibility depends on various contextual factors.
This new understanding of paternalism’s impermissibility has a signifi-
cant bearing on policy. Recent high-profile policy proposals—most notably
the Affordable Care Act—raised important questions about paternalism. But
the ensuing debate can feel like ships passing in the night, with one side
fixating on a visceral objection6 and the other side emphasizing more tangi-
ble consequences.7 Because both sides lack a coherent conceptual framework
6. See, e.g., Michael Tanner, Paternalism and Principle, Nat’l Rev. (Oct. 5, 2011, 4:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279178/paternalism-and-principle-michael-tan-
ner (comparing efforts to ban incandescent light bulbs and the Affordable Care Act and argu-
ing that they are similarly paternalistic).
7. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Paternalism Is Your Friend, New Republic (Apr. 8,
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112817/cass-sunstein-simpler-book-excerpt-why-
paternalism-your-friend.
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for thinking about paternalism, there is little meaningful engagement. My
hope is that by clarifying the concepts underlying these arguments, we can
begin to bridge this gap. This paper seeks to provide some framework for
determining whether something like the Affordable Care Act or any other
proposal is paternalistic in a problematic way. It attempts to point the criti-
cal lens at the appropriate set of considerations, many of which are often not
appreciated.
Methodologically, this Article employs the tool of normative ethics and
builds on and responds to recent philosophical work on paternalism.8 The
goal of this philosophical project—a proper understanding of the normative
significance of paternalism—is essential to clarifying our legal and policy
discourse, in which paternalism serves as a routine bugaboo. Thus, I de-
scribe ways throughout that the abstract question—what’s wrong with pa-
ternalism—has substantive practical implications.
The Article proceeds in the following way. Part I examines the view that
paternalism is negatively charged because it involves coercion. In particular,
I focus on the recent position of libertarian paternalism, which suggests that
paternalism that is not coercive is less objectionable. Part II considers the
view that paternalism is bad because of the intentions that it involves. I offer
reasons to doubt that intentions can explain what is normatively significant,
both in general and in the particular context of paternalism. Part III de-
scribes a third alternative—namely, that paternalism’s normative character
is based on its expressive content. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Coercion
The simplest theory of paternalism holds that paternalism is bad be-
cause it involves coercion. What is wrong with paternalism, according to this
view, is that it denies individuals the ability to make choices about their own
lives. This view underwrites recent calls for so-called “libertarian paternal-
ism.” In the next Section, I examine this line of argument. After reviewing a
common objection, I suggest that libertarian paternalism’s real difficulty is
that paternalism isn’t necessarily wrong because it is coercive. Coercion, I
argue, is not the touchstone for objectionable paternalism.
A. Libertarian Paternalism
The view that paternalism is bad because it involves coercion provides
the theoretical framework for Professors Thaler and Sunstein’s widely
acclaimed book, Nudge,9 and for subsequent behavioral economics policy
8. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism, 11
Legal Theory 259, 274–75 (2005); Peter de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, 34 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 68 (2006); Shiffrin, supra note 4; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Pater-
nalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs
Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 Yale L.J. 1826 (2013).
9. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 11 (updated ed. 2009).
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proposals.10 For Thaler and Sunstein, what makes paternalism wrong is that
it violates the libertarian principle that one should respect individual
choices.11 This assumption opens the possibility that noncoercive paternal-
ism is not wrong. Thaler and Sunstein offer a panoply of suggestions as to
how noncoercive paternalism can be realized.12 By altering the conditions
under which choices are made, we can encourage people to make better
choices—thereby improving their lives without coercing them at all. As long
as the paternalism is libertarian, it is permissible.13 Thaler and Sunstein’s
admirably succinct idea and its audaciously wide-reaching applications have
received praise and public attention from commentators.14 Legal scholars
and public policy experts have begun to internalize the main idea as a versa-
tile tool to support various positions.15 Even Barack Obama and David Cam-
eron have openly embraced Thaler and Sunstein’s proposals.16
The basic idea is elegant: because all sorts of small factors affect the
choices that people make, policymakers can greatly improve people’s welfare
by improving people’s choices. In other words, Thaler and Sunstein explain
an empirical proposition—that seemingly trivial features of our situation
when we make a choice can alter what choice we make—and then deploy
this empirical finding as a policy tool.
Consider the empirical point first. As Thaler and Sunstein put it,
“[S]mall and apparently insignificant details can have major impacts on
people’s behavior. A good rule of thumb is to assume that ‘everything mat-
ters.’ ”17 The idea here isn’t anything new. One might say that Thaler and
Sunstein are just summarizing the main insight of behavioral psychologists
and economists. But the collection of various examples, presented all at once
10. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1833–37.
11. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 5, 252–54.
12. See id. at 255.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Friedman, Book Review, Guiding Forces, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24,
2008, at BR13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/24/books/review/Friedman-
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (calling most of Thaler and Sunstein’s proposals “the essence of
common sense”).
15. See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, Libertarian Paternalism, Externalities, and the “Spirit of Lib-
erty”: How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us Toward an “Overlapping Consensus”, 36 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 263, 263 (2011) (“I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking
about policy making, but that ‘choice architecture’ is not just a solution to the problem of
cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making.”).
16. See, e.g., Nick Collins, David Cameron Seeks to ‘Nudge’ People in Right Direction,
Telegraph (Sept. 10, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cam-
eron/7993366/David-Cameron-seeks-to-Nudge-people-in-the-right-direction.html (“While in
opposition the Conservative leader was so impressed with the book that he required all shadow
cabinet members to read it during their summer holiday.”); Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is
Using the Science of Change, Time (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1889153,00.html (“ ‘Cass is one of the people in the Administration
[Obama] knows best,’ says Thaler . . . . ‘He knew what he was doing when he gave Cass that
job.’ ”).
17. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 3.
1300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1295
as an armada of human decisional failings, is impressive. Seemingly irrele-
vant suggestions will alter our assessments—writing down your phone
number will affect your guess about what year Attila the Hun sacked Eu-
rope.18 We are heavily influenced by peer pressure—given simple factual
questions that they would invariably get right on their own, people will give
the wrong answer surprisingly often if surrounded by others giving the
wrong answer.19 We unreflectively choose available options—people will eat
vastly more of something they acknowledge isn’t very good, like stale pop-
corn, merely because it is placed in front of them.20 The list goes on and on.
The point is that human choices are influenced by all sorts of small, seem-
ingly irrelevant details.
If one believes that people could make better choices in many circum-
stances, then creating more favorable conditions can induce people to make
choices that will ultimately make them better off. The big idea is that by
slightly changing the structures within which people make choices, we can
alter what choices they make. Thaler and Sunstein offer the example of a
cafeteria, which can encourage diners to eat healthier foods based on where
in the cafeteria different foods are displayed (first or last, eye-level or off to
the side, etc.).21 They refer to such subtle influencing as making changes in
the “choice architecture”22—or, for short, “nudging.”23 Of course, not every-
one’s choices will be altered, but even small changes in the choice architec-
ture can induce significant shifts in distribution of choices by a population.
And, if leveraged properly, this means that whoever determines the choice
architecture can induce more people to make good choices, without shoving
anything down their throats.
This last point is important to Thaler and Sunstein. Nudges aren’t
shoves—they don’t require anything.24 That is, changing the choice architec-
ture isn’t coercive in the way that simply mandating or prohibiting particu-
lar behavior is. It is gentler. Although Thaler and Sunstein concede that
government intervention to try to make people better off is paternalistic,25
18. Id. at 23–24.
19. Id. at 56–57.
20. Id. at 43.
21. Id. at 1–3.
22. Id. at 3, 11 (“A choice architect has the responsibility for organizing the context in
which people make decisions. . . . Choice architects can make major improvements to the lives
of others by designing user-friendly environments.”)
23. Id. at 6 (“A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture
that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or signifi-
cantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be
easy and cheap to avoid.”).
24. Id. (“Nudges are not mandates.”).
25. I think that Thaler and Sunstein are correct, as a descriptive matter, to say that
nudges can still be a form of paternalism. For example,
[i]magine the government makes free psychotherapy available to gays and lesbians to
help them change their sexual orientation, and that it does so with the aim of helping
them to lead happier, more satisfying lives, and that this policy cannot be justified in any
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this intervention is considered less objectionable precisely because it is less
coercive. Thus their term “libertarian paternalism.” They explain as follows:
Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of
paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off. In its most cau-
tious forms, libertarian paternalism imposes trivial costs on those who seek
to depart from the planner’s preferred option. But the approach we recom-
mend nonetheless counts as paternalistic, because private and public plan-
ners are not trying to track people’s anticipated choices, but are self-
consciously attempting to move people in welfare-promoting directions.26
The idea here is that nudges are admittedly paternalistic because they involve
intervening in others’ choices in order to make them better, but they are not
objectionably paternalistic because they are libertarian. Nudges are okay, as
long as they don’t rise to the level of a push.
Although Thaler and Sunstein are not always explicit about it, their view
of paternalism involves two important conceptual moves. First, they detach
the idea of paternalism from the idea of coercion.27 The term libertarian
paternalism is meant to expand what counts as paternalism beyond the nar-
row coercive understanding. The very term “libertarian paternalism” implies
that not all paternalism is coercive. Second, by endorsing this paternalism in
its libertarian form, Thaler and Sunstein implicitly suggest that what is typi-
cally wrong with paternalism is its nonlibertarian qualities. They are, in a
sense, saying, “What’s wrong with paternalism isn’t the paternalism per se,
but the coercion—and we can get rid of that!”
The nudge/push distinction invokes a metaphor of physical contact.
One can press that metaphor further. In an article discussing the worst offi-
ciating errors at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, the Christian Science
Monitor included the following description of one of the more dubious
decisions:
At the end of the game, when Ivory Coast was bound for defeat, the
Ivory Coast’s Abdelkader Keita apparently wished to exact some measure of
revenge. This he did by approaching Brazilian superstar Kaka, then falling
over in theatrical agony (clutching his face) when the Brazilian gave him a
other way. Some may think that if the intended beneficiaries do not want this policy,
then it is objectionably paternalistic even if it does not, strictly speaking, limit anyone’s
choices.
De Marneffe, supra note 8, at 74–75. This definitely strikes me as paternalistic, and not even a
particularly fringe case. It seems right, therefore, that Thaler and Sunstein accept that even a
gentle nudge may be appropriately called paternalistic.
26. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 8, at 1162 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 1165 (“The second misconception is that paternalism always involves coer-
cion.”). Others have noted that paternalism does not necessarily involve coercion. See N. Fo-
tion, Paternalism, 89 Ethics 191, 195 (1979) (“The fact is that some philosophers have given
paternalism a far worse reputation than it deserves by associating it with coercion by definition
and in effect confusing it with coercive paternalism.”).
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playful nudge (in the ribs). Kaka’s reward: a second yellow card, which
meant ejection.28
As another sportswriter observed, these theatrics were hardly something
new: “At the 1998 World Cup, Slaven Bilic of Croatia cost [French great]
Laurent Blanc a place in the final by exaggerating a nudge in the chest into a
blow to the face, during France’s 2-1 semi-final win.”29 In both cases, justice
was miscarried because a mere nudge was penalized as though it were a
flagrant foul.
Any soccer fan knows that it is not permissible to “push” another player
on the field. But to “nudge” him, as these sportswriters imply, does not have
the connotation of rising to an offense. A soccer fan can even imagine the
voice of a protesting defender saying, “But I barely nudged him.” In this
context, the word is used to suggest that the physical contact did not deter-
mine the result. The merely “nudged” player isn’t knocked to the ground,
but chooses to fall to the ground.
One might say Thaler and Sunstein have a soccer theory of paternalism.
They make the same distinction as the sportswriters—nudging, no foul;
pushing, more problematic. Not only that, they make the distinction for the
same reason. Thaler and Sunstein suggest that nudging is unobjectionable
because it preserves the control of the party being nudged. Unlike a push, if
one succumbs to the nudge it is by choice (or inaction) rather than by brute
force. And this makes quite an important difference to concerns about pa-
ternalism. One might say that Thaler and Sunstein’s work represents three
propositions about paternalism: (1) nudging is generally a permissible form
of paternalism; (2) pushing—for lack of a better term—is generally a more
objectionable form of paternalism;30 and consequently (3) what is primarily
objectionable about paternalism is the coercive element.31
I want to suggest that all three of the above propositions are incorrect.
In real life, if not in soccer, nudging may be as objectionable as pushing, or
more. And pushing may sometimes be permissible. If these claims are
correct—if the permissibility of paternalism doesn’t simply depend on the
28. Mark Sappenfield, Bad Calls: Top Five Refereeing Gaffes of the 2010 World Cup,
Christian Sci. Monitor (June 27, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-
Monitor/2010/0627/Bad-calls-Top-five-refereeing-gaffes-of-the-2010-World-Cup.
29. John Doyle, The Dive, Globe & Mail, June 9, 2010, at E6, available at http://www
.theglobeandmail.com/sports/soccer/the-dive/article1372535/.
30. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 254 (“[W]e resist going further down
the paternalistic path. . . . [D]eciding where to stop, and when to call a nudge a shove (much
less a prison), is tricky. Where mandates are involved and opt-outs are unavailable, the slip-
pery-slope argument can begin to have some merit, especially if regulators are heavy-handed.
We agree that flat bans are justified in some contexts, but they raise distinctive concerns, and,
in general, we prefer interventions that are more libertarian and less intrusive.”).
31. See id. As the physical metaphors imply, the focus here is on brute control. For a
contrasting conception of the morally significant idea of liberty, see Peter de Marneffe, Self-
Sovereignty and Paternalism, in Paternalism: Theory and Practice 56, 56–58 (Christian
Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013) (contrasting self-ownership with self-sovereignty).
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degree of coercion—then a different account of what is objectionable about
paternalism is required.
Backed by their conceptual framework, Thaler and Sunstein describe a
great many ways that libertarian paternalism can be put to use. Changing
the default options on retirement and organ donor forms, for example, has
the potential to dramatically increase household savings and save thousands
of lives per year in organ donations.32 Disclosure requirements may en-
courage people to make better choices with regard to mortgage or credit
card debt. And so on. Many of the policies Thaler and Sunstein suggest
strike me as excellent proposals.33 I am less concerned with whether these
policies are good, however, as with the justification offered for them. That is,
does the background idea of libertarian paternalism provide a good frame-
work for understanding why some paternalistic policies are justified but
others may not be? I argue that it does not—and that a wholly different
theory of paternalism is required.
B. The Inadequacy of Appealing to Deception
A number of commentators on Thaler and Sunstein’s book have noted
their discomfort with the idea of nudging.34 Subtle behind-the-scenes ma-
nipulation of people’s choices has a Big Brother element that understandably
makes people nervous.
The discomfort with nudging may be based on the apparent deception
involved. The idea that another person might be manipulating our choices
without our knowledge is, in this case, a cause for unease. The Big Brother
fear comes from the sense that we might be kept in the dark while we are
32. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 110–11, 177–78.
33. Many of the suggested nudges, it should be noted, don’t seem terribly libertarian. For
example, Thaler and Sunstein suggest various things that one might require from lenders, even
things as small as the ability to automatically pay one’s full credit card bill. See Thaler &
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 146. Although such policies are nudges to consumers, they are
shoves to credit card companies.
34. See, e.g., Shawn Macomber, The Man Whispers, Am. Spectator, Oct. 2008, at 70
(describing Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge as a book “in which the eminent professors argue for
a more sophisticated, subliminal Nanny State led by a less draconian nanny”); Dominique
Lazanski, A Nudge Towards Totalitarianism?, Inst. Econ. Aff. (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www
.iea.org.uk/blog/a-nudge-towards-totalitarianism-0 (“We should fear a nudge culture, be wary
of elitists and continue to shun we-think. Being nudged is not far off from being regulated,
and relegated, into a totalitarian society.”); Dahlia Lithwick, Taming Your Inner Homer Simp-
son: How to Opt Out of Our Own Stupid Choices, Slate (May 12, 2008, 7:03 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2008/05/taming_your_inner_homer_simpson.html (“Is it oh-so-
slightly creepy (or socialist) to envision a world in which shadowy choice architects are nudg-
ing you away from the cashews and toward organ donation?”); cf. Mark D. White, The
Manipulation of Choice: Ethics and Libertarian Paternalism 82 (2013) (“Even if one is
comfortable with some paternalism on the part of the government if done openly and trans-
parently, it is unseemly for policymakers to use people’s decision-making flaws to manipulate
them, subtly and secretly, into making choices that policymakers want them to make, rather
than the ones they would have otherwise made themselves.”); Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn
Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge, 18 J. Pol. Phil. 123, 130 (2010) (“[T]here may be
something more insidious about shaping choices than about open constraint.”).
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pushed about like pawns. In short, the whole idea of nudging feels, to use a
technical term, too sneaky. This gut reaction motivates many responses to
Thaler and Sunstein.
This form of the objection, however, is ultimately rather weak. There is
really nothing about nudging that requires deception. For example, Thaler
and Sunstein’s iconic cafeteria could display signs telling customers that the
foods have been arranged in a manner to encourage healthy choices. I doubt
that such openness about the presence of nudging would truly allay the con-
cerns of objectors. So it seems that it is not the deception that generates
qualms about nudging.
I argue the concern is better understood in another way. This way of
understanding the discomfort accounts for the fact that even candid nudg-
ing still carries the sting of paternalism. That is, it’s not the deceptiveness
that gives nudging its slightly ominous Big Brother feel, but rather some-
thing else—the something else that I will argue is fundamentally wrong with
paternalism.35 So even if the cafeteria puts up plenty of signs informing pa-
trons that the food has been arranged to induce better choices (eliminating
any lack of openness), and even if the policy is very clear that patrons are
free to make whatever choices they like (eliminating any sense of coercion),
the problem of paternalism will remain. It is the aim of this Article to say
what this problem is—what is wrong with paternalism apart from its fre-
quent (but not necessary) association with deception or coercion?
C. Disentangling Force and Objectionable Paternalism
From the perspective of libertarian paternalism, forcing another person
to do something for her own benefit is generally less permissible than merely
nudging her toward the decision on her own. But it’s not clear that this is
correct. Some degree of forcing each other to do things for our own benefit
is permissible within—perhaps even characteristic of—our most caring re-
lationships. That is, a touch of paternalistic coercion may be okay in the
right contexts—occasional forceful intervention may even be preferable to
nudging. Consider the following pair of examples.
35. Hausman and Welch make this particularly clear: “What matters is whether the pol-
icy-maker is attempting to bring about something against the beneficiary’s will.” Hausman &
Welch, supra note 34, at 130; see also J.S. Blumenthal-Barby, Choice Architecture: A Mechanism
for Improving Decisions While Preserving Liberty?, in Paternalism: Theory and Practice,
supra note 31, at 178, 191–92 (“[D]isclosure and transparency is [sic] not enough to preserve
liberty since manipulation . . . occurs not just when a person is influenced without knowing it,
but when they are influenced via exploitation of the non-rational elements of their psychologi-
cal makeup.”). Hausman and Welch’s primary point is that an infringement on autonomy can
take on another form than a simple constriction of the set of available choices. I agree with this
insight, and I think that Hausman and Welch helpfully draw attention to one way in which the
nudging arguments can be overly simplistic. Still, it seems that a policy can be objectionably
paternalistic even when it is only attempting to counteract the beneficiary’s foibles and help
empower her own choice—which, as Thaler and Sunstein show, can be the aim behind a very
many nudges.
June 2015] A Third Theory of Paternalism 1305
Overworking 1: You have a tendency to spend far too many beautiful
summer days in the office taking appointments and holding meetings. In
particular, your Fridays are generally dominated by the staff meeting that
you administer. As you frequently acknowledge, the meeting is hardly criti-
cal, and no one would be bothered if the meeting were canceled or delayed.
But the inertia of routine always ends up winning out, and you are always
stuck in the meeting on Friday. One Friday morning your husband shows up
at the office and informs you that he has arranged with your secretary to
reschedule your staff meeting and other appointments. He has rented a sail-
boat for the two of you, and packed bags and food for a three-day weekend
itinerary of sailing and camping on some local islands. Although your hus-
band is rather indifferent to it, you really love sailing and hardly ever get to
do it. When you say you need to think about it, he informs you that the
meeting has already been rescheduled and some people have already gone
home. We might imagine him saying something like, “You always spend so
much time in the office, but today you have no choice. I’m going to force
you to get out and enjoy yourself.” And with that, he might physically take
the briefcase out of your hands, place a firm arm around your waist, and
pull you to the door—all over your meek protests.
Overworking 2: As with the first example, you tend to overwork yourself
on matters that you acknowledge aren’t pressing. You admit that working a
little less would be better for you, but you never seem to manage to change
your habits. In this example, though, your husband always respects whatever
choices you make, but he tries to give you little nudges so that you choose to
work less. When you are working late in the office, he sometimes urges your
daughter to call and tell you she misses you. As the two of you are heading
out the door, he sometimes hides your Blackberry where you are apt to
forget it. He rearranges the home office in a way that makes it less conducive
to working at home in the evenings, which he thinks is bad for your health.
He occasionally stalls or fails in passing along work-related phone messages
that he doesn’t believe to be pressing.
I think that the husband in the first example is not, at least prima facie,
acting impermissibly. In fact, one might see this as a very nice, or even
romantic, gesture of care for the interests of his spouse. The behavior in the
second example is, I think, substantially more objectionable. This is true
even though the conduct in the second example is less forceful and easier for
the spouse to resist.
One might be tempted to object here that the example is a bit loaded.
For one thing, further descriptions of the background facts could be rele-
vant: if the husband in the first example is frequently meddlesome or pa-
tronizing then the behavior might seem a lot worse. And surely that the
parties are married is important. Note, however, that this cannot be because
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marriage itself licenses some quantum of coercion—despite what innumera-
ble poor jokes might tell us.36 Lastly, it is unclear to what extent personal
interventions like these examples can be compared to government policies. I
will return to these various complexities.37 But my aim here is merely to
think about the relationship between coercion and paternalism.
In these examples, the behavior described is reasonably characterized as
paternalistic. In each case, the husband attempts to alter his partner’s behav-
ior for the sake of the partner’s interests. But the forceful intervention seems
less problematic than the persistent nudging.
The contrast illustrates two critical points. First, the problematic feature
of paternalism is not the coercive interference with choices. The second rela-
tionship—the less coercive one, in the sense that the subject can more read-
ily continue on her preferred course of action—seems more objectionable.
What’s more, the second relationship seems more objectionable for the rea-
sons that paternalism is objectionable.38 That is, the second relationship is
36. I do not mean to deny that, in many intimate relationships, parties will implicitly or
explicitly consent to limited forms of coercion. But it seems a mistake or a fiction to think that
the appropriateness of coercive intervention always depends on some implied consent.
37. Lest one think that the argument is driven only by the idiosyncrasies of this example,
consider another pair of examples.
Smoking 1: You are a smoker. You want to quit, and you tried a few times. Most of your
friends are smokers too, and this social pressure makes it much more difficult to quit. Your
best friend is also a smoker. The two of you sometimes discuss plans to quit together, but
nothing ever comes to fruition. You often back out at the last minute, although you always
regret it afterwards. Recently, the two of you planned a fishing trip together in Northern
Canada, far from civilization. A water plane is dropping you off and picking you up two weeks
later, with only emergency contacts. Unbeknownst to you, your friend removes the several
cases of cigarettes that the two of you packed. Only after takeoff does your friend inform you
that the fishing trip is going to be a chance to quit smoking cold turkey. He says that the two
of you have tried so many times that something drastic was needed.
Smoking 2: Again, you are a smoker. You would like to quit, and your best friend would
like to see you quit for the sake of your health. But your friend always says that quitting is a
choice that you have to make—all he can do is encourage you to make it. So he is constantly
giving you subtle encouragement. He tapes pictures of your children to your cigarette packages
when you aren’t around. He sends you emails with graphic photographs of body organs that
have been ruined by years of smoking. He demands that you always ask permission to smoke
around him—just as an extra hurdle, not because he ever denies it. And as the owner of the
pharmacy that happens to be on the block where you live, he has even implemented a policy of
charging you triple for cigarette packages—with the surplus going into a scholarship fund for
your children, to whom he has begun referring to as “the poor little orphans-to-be.”
In this pair of examples, again, I think that the first friend may not be acting impermissi-
bly; whereas, the second friend is almost surely treating his friend in an unacceptable way.
Once again, however, the devil is in the details. One could object that there is an important
difference between the examples: in the first, the friend is also a smoker. Surely this is signifi-
cant. If the first example is altered so that the friend is not a fellow smoker, then it changes the
complexion substantially. Once again, I will return to this point. But notice for now that it is
not the case that coercion is generally permissible if the coercer puts himself through the same
thing. One cannot place another in shackles merely because one has also shackled oneself.
These examples suggest that an isolated bit of coercion can sometimes be permissible—some-
times more so than persistent, less intrusive intervention. But context matters tremendously.
38. Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Paternalism and Autonomy, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 27, 38
(1981) (“The conclusion that paternalistic interferences, qua interferences, are objectionable, is
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problematic precisely because it exhibits the negative features of paternalism.
The second relationship is bad because it is paternalistic, whereas the first
relationship is, arguably, not bad despite its paternalism. The contrast be-
tween the examples, therefore, offers a clue into what is wrong with pater-
nalism. Something about the paternalism in the second relationship must be
the normatively significant element of paternalism.
This relates to the second point. The first example suggests that pater-
nalism—even coercive paternalism—is not always impermissible. The hus-
band forces a certain action on you, and, in each case, the action is meant to
be for your own good. This is a classic example of paternalism. And yet, if
enough background is provided and the action is viewed charitably, it may
not seem at all objectionable. Whatever it is that is impermissible about
paternalism, it seems to be either absent or muted in these cases. This poten-
tially offers a second clue about what is wrong with paternalism.
If these points are correct, then the conventional link between imper-
missible paternalism and coercion39 breaks down in both directions. An ac-
tion can be impermissibly paternalistic without being coercive—that is,
coercion is not necessary for impermissibility. And an action can be coercive
and paternalistic yet not impermissible—that is, coercion is not sufficient
for impermissibility.
II. Intention
Thus far, I have argued that the objectionable element of paternalism is
not its coercive element. Obviously coercion is often impermissible, but
what is distinctly objectionable about paternalism is not that it is coercive.
There is, however, a second theory of paternalism that deserves atten-
tion. It is tempting to think that the objectionable element of paternalism
comes from the intention behind it. One might, for example, find something
objectionable about acting with the intention of benefiting people in a way
that they have not themselves accepted. For example, Gerald Dworkin says,
“Paternalism might be thought of as the use of coercion to achieve a good
which is not recognized as such by those persons for whom the good is
intended.”40 On such a view, the unique problem with paternalism lies in
intending to bring about an end that is not endorsed by the other party. Or,
slightly differently, what is objectionable about paternalism is that the agent
intends to substitute her judgment for someone else’s—whether or not it is
for that person’s benefit. Seana Shiffrin, for example, argues that “[a]n ac-
tion may be paternalist . . . if it involves a person’s aiming to take over or
a good deal less interesting than the conclusion that paternalistic interferences, qua paternal-
ism, are objectionable.”).
39. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 11.
40. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in Morality and the Law 107, 112 (Richard A. Was-
serstrom ed., 1971).
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control what is properly within the agent’s own legitimate domain of judg-
ment or action.”41 On this view, an action may raise concerns of paternalism
even if it is not done to benefit the person per se. For example, taking com-
mand of someone else’s question during an academic discussion because
one wants to see the question formulated properly might constitute
paternalism.42
In accounts of this form, whether an action counts as paternalistic—and
relatedly, whether an action is objectionable—depends on the motive or
intent behind the action.43 It is natural to think that whether an action or
policy is paternalistic depends on why it is undertaken. For example, if I
decide not to serve dessert at a dinner party because I think my guests are
getting a little overweight, that would seem quite paternalistic.44 But if the
omission were based on my own need to economize, then it surely would
41. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 216 (emphasis added). Shiffrin rigorously explicates the
concept:
I suggest that paternalism by A toward B may be characterized as behavior (whether
through action or through omission) (a) aimed to have (or to avoid) an effect on B or
her sphere of legitimate agency (b) that involves the substitution of A’s judgment or
agency for B’s (c) directed at B’s own interests or matters that legitimately lie within B’s
control (d) undertaken on the grounds that compared to B’s judgment or agency with
respect to those interests or other matters, A regards her judgment or agency to be (or as
likely to be), in some respect, superior to B’s.
Id. at 218. As de Marneffe points out, Shiffrin’s own project of seeking a nonpaternalist ratio-
nale for the unconscionability doctrine seems to be in tension with holding a motive-based
approach. de Marneffe, supra note 8, at 70–71.
42. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 217.
43. See id. at 220 (“The motive, I think, is what is central to accounting for why paternal-
ism delivers a special sort of insult to competent, autonomous agents. Even when paternalist
behavior does not violate a distinct, independent autonomy right, it still manifests an attitude
of disrespect toward highly salient qualities of the autonomous agent. The essential motive
behind a paternalist act evinces a failure to respect either the capacity of the agent to judge, the
capacity of the agent to act, or the propriety of the agent’s exerting control over a sphere that is
legitimately her domain.”). Note that my own account is actually quite similar to Shiffrin’s in
important ways. See id. I think that Shiffrin is entirely correct in viewing paternalism as objec-
tionable because it represents an “insult” or “a failure to respect.” My difference with Shiffrin
is that I do not take the motive to be the important aspect but rather the external meaning of
the behavior. See id. at 217. I share Shiffrin’s view that an action can be paternalistic without
being aimed at benefiting the paternalized person.
44. It is interesting to contrast this example with the example of Thaler’s dinner party, in
which he takes the pre-dinner cashews away from the guests to ensure that everyone retains
room for dinner. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 40. Even worse than choosing not to
serve dessert would be serving dessert and then taking it away upon realizing that guests were
beginning to eat too much of it for their own waistlines. So why is retracting food to ensure
others enjoy the rest of a dinner party perfectly acceptable, but retracting food to prevent
others from putting on extra pounds obviously unacceptable? One plausible answer is that by
coming to a dinner party, one surrenders a certain degree of control to the host over how one
will enjoy the evening—one tacitly accepts the authority of the host to determine what makes
for a good meal or entertaining activities. One certainly does not grant control over body
weight issues. But this isn’t the entire story. Imagine that it is not the host (Thaler), but
another guest who removes the cashews so everyone enjoys the meal. This may often seem
acceptable, but it is not because of some delegation of authority. Rather, I think, this is an
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not be an example of paternalism. Despite this natural appeal, I suggest
three related reasons to reject an intent-based approach to paternalism.
These reasons derive from the fact that we can assess the permissibility of
paternalistic actions or policies without delving into the actor’s intention.
A. Intentions, Permissibility, and the Doctrine of Double Effect
The first reason to reject an intent-based account of paternalism is
grounded in general philosophical concerns about the relationship between
intent and permissibility. We care about the concept of paternalism because
of its normative significance.45 Paternalism is, at least sometimes, a feature of
behavior that makes that behavior impermissible. But there is good reason
to think that the intent with which an action is performed does not affect
the permissibility of that action. If both of these premises are correct, then
paternalism is not characterized by a particular kind of intent.
But why think that intent does not matter to permissibility? The answer
can be seen by considering a set of recent philosophical arguments leveled
against the so-called doctrine of double effect, which roughly says that one
may cause a bad outcome in order to achieve a greater good if and only if
one does not intend the bad outcome.46 The recent assaults on this doctrine
point out that the intention of an agent bears on how we would evaluate the
agent, not on the permissibility of the action itself. To see the basic idea,
consider an example from Judith Thomson:
Here is Alfred, whose wife is dying, and whose death he wishes to
hasten. He buys a certain stuff, thinking it a poison and intending to give it
to his wife to hasten her death. Unbeknownst to him, that stuff is the only
existing cure for what ails his wife. Is it permissible for Alfred to give it to
her? Surely yes. We cannot plausibly think that the fact that if he gives it to
her he will give it to her to kill her means that he may not give it to her.
(How could his having a bad intention make it impermissible for him to do
what she needs for life?)47
Alfred’s attempt to kill his wife is quite probably blameworthy.48 It re-
flects something bad about Alfred that he would try to kill his wife. But that
is an evaluation of the agent, not the action. When one asks if the action
example of the way that paternalism may be permissible—it does not express an overall im-
permissible judgment about others.
45. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 212 (“[I]t seems worthwhile to assess what is central in
our normative reactions to paternalism and to employ a conception of paternalism that com-
pliments and makes intelligible our sense of paternalism’s normative significance.”). But see
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 8, at 1166 (“The thrust of our argument is that the term ‘pater-
nalistic’ should not be considered pejorative, just descriptive.”).
46. F.M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm
91–129 (2007); T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
20–25 (2008); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-defense, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283, 292–96 (1991).
47. Thomson, supra note 46, at 293–94.
48. Assume that Alfred doesn’t have his wife’s consent and isn’t merely trying to relieve
her suffering.
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itself is permissible—i.e., may one permissibly give this compound to this
woman—the answer seems to be yes. In other words, what seems to matter
to permissibility is the nature of the action itself—its character and effects—
rather than the mental state of the agent.49 Someone might do something
permissible with bad intent, and someone might do something impermissi-
ble with a good intention. If this is correct—if intent does not bear on per-
missibility50—and if paternalism does affect permissibility, then paternalism
must not be determined by intentions.
In response to this argument, one might be tempted to question the
original premise that paternalism affects permissibility. The distinction be-
tween evaluating an action and evaluating an agent—between permissibility
and blameworthiness—may be convincing. But one might think that the
normative significance of paternalism is not that it describes a way in which
an action may be impermissible, but rather a way in which it may be blame-
worthy. In other words, perhaps paternalism isn’t something that matters in
deliberating about an action, but rather is only significant as a way of criti-
cizing an action.51 Paternalism, like the concept of malice, would identify a
negative feature of another’s attitudes, but not necessarily of their actions.
This is a plausible position, against which I can only suggest some con-
siderations. The difficulty with this position is that the concept of paternal-
ism seems to play a deliberative function. That a policy would be
paternalistic is viewed as a reason not to adopt it.52 In political discussions
49. See Kamm, supra note 46, at 135 (“[W]hat is important for permissibility are the
characteristics of the act itself and its effects . . . . When it is impermissible for an agent who
intends evil (as a means or end) to do an act, it will usually be because of some characteristics
of the act or its effects (or their relation) independent of his intention.” (footnote omitted));
Scanlon, supra note 46, at 23 (“[W]hat makes an action wrong is the consideration or consid-
erations that count decisively against it, not the agent’s failure to give these considerations the
proper weight.”); Thomson, supra note 46, at 294 (“It is irrelevant to the question whether X
may do alpha what intention X would do alpha with if he or she did it.”).
50. This may be a bit too general. There may be cases in which intention does matter to
permissibility. Scanlon, for example, discusses discrimination as an example. See Scanlon,
supra note 46, at 69–74. But what generates the impermissibility in such cases is not the
intention itself. In Scanlon’s terms, the intention may affect the meaning of the action, and in
some contexts the meaning of the action will matter to permissibility. For example, a discrimi-
natory motive makes an action count as discrimination. But if this is right, then it is the
meaning of the action, e.g., that it is a racial insult, that determines permissibility, and the
intention enters only because it is relevant to determining that meaning. Cf. id. at 72
(“[D]ecisions that we call discriminatory are objectionable because they involve a kind of
insult—an expression of the view that certain people are inferior or socially unacceptable.”).
In this case, it is the insult that matters to permissibility. The intention enters only contin-
gently. For this reason, one can unintentionally discriminate, just as one can unintentionally
paternalize.
51. Cf. id. at 26 (“It would be quite correct to say [that what makes an action wrong is
the intention] if we were taking the relevant principle in its critical employment and assessing
the way in which the agent decided what to do.”).
52. One might note that “it would be murder” might seem to count as a reason against a
certain action. But this is only because murder has particular legal consequences associated
with it. To see this point, notice that the knowledge that one would be found not guilty by
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and policy debates, paternalism counts against adopting a particular policy.53
For example, if a legislature were discussing requiring motorcycle helmets,
presumably a large part of the argument against it would be that such a
policy would be paternalistic. This is not mere name calling. It is identifying
a particular reason, perhaps one that is not decisive, that counts against the
proposed policy. If this is right, then paternalism seems to be a concept with
a deliberative normative significance.
I think this is part of the reason why attempts to rationalize seemingly
paternalistic policies in terms of nonpaternalistic reasons—for example, jus-
tifying a law requiring motorcycle helmets on the basis of public health ex-
penditures—seem misguided. Such attempts implicitly presuppose
something like the doctrine of double effect; it is assumed that causing a
particular harm is permissible as long as one doesn’t intend that harm. But
it seems strange that, from the deliberative standpoint, the permissibility of
an action depends on the intention of the actor. Either the action is permis-
sible or it’s not.
B. Unintended Paternalism
There are more particular reasons, as well, to think that the objectiona-
ble element of paternalism does not depend on intentions. Whether or not
one accepts that permissibility is independent of intentions in the general
way described in the previous section, there are some actions for which it is
hard to dispute that impermissibility does not depend on having a bad in-
tention. I argue that paternalism falls into such a class.
Verbal insults offer a clear example of actions that can be wrong regard-
less of the agent’s intention. It is certainly less blameworthy to utter some-
thing offensive if one didn’t intend it offensively. Perhaps one didn’t know
that one’s interlocutor had recently lost a child, or is a Republican, or is an
Arsenal supporter. Or perhaps one just blurted something out—something
one doesn’t even really believe. Or perhaps one was trying to be encouraging
and it just came out wrong. But even if this sort of lack of intentionality can
alter how blameworthy one is, it doesn’t change permissibility. Saying X to
person Y under conditions C may be wrong, regardless of the intent with
which it is said.
I argue that the same is true of paternalism. Just as one can inadver-
tently insult someone, one can be inadvertently paternalistic. For example,
suppose that a park ranger puts up a sign that says “Climbing on rocks
prohibited” because she thinks it will protect certain delicate lichens. The
policy ends up preventing rock climbers from using one of the area’s more
challenging ledges, which has seen some recent accidents. The park ranger,
reason of insanity would not in any way lessen the reasons against performing the action—
except for those reasons related to the legal consequences for you.
53. See, e.g., supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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however, did not even think about the rock climbers as she created the pol-
icy. Nevertheless, a rock climber might plausibly criticize the policy as
paternalistic.
Or suppose a father buys a gift for his adult daughter, genuinely think-
ing it will be something she will enjoy—perhaps a new business suit—when
actually it is something that she would need only if her life were quite differ-
ent than it is—perhaps she does not aspire to work in a business or office
setting. One might say that this is objectionable because it is paternalistic,
even though the father has no intent to circumvent his daughter’s
judgment.54
In both of these cases, the charge of paternalism might depend on a
mistaken inference about the actor’s intentions. The rock climbers object
because they assume the park ranger was trying to stop their climbing; the
daughter objects because she assumes her father wants her to be more pro-
fessional. This may be part of the story. But it is not the whole story. Ex-
plaining that the intention in question was not there does not necessarily
remove the wrong. The park ranger and the father have not merely pro-
duced an illusion of paternalism; they have been paternalistic, albeit ac-
cidently. Their actions were paternalistic, even if their intentions were not.
If paternalism can be accidental in this way, then paternalism does not
require any particular intent or motive.55 Paternalism, in this sense, refers to
a generally bad way of treating others. We can commit this wrong through
inattention, laziness, or negligence, as much as through deliberate choice.
And that suggests that the problem with paternalism isn’t the intention be-
hind it per se.
C. Intentionality and Group Action
Above, I suggest that what’s wrong with paternalism is not the intention
behind it, both because intention does not generally alter permissibility and
because actions can be objectionably paternalistic without any particular
intention.
54. Shiffrin accepts that paternalism need not require an intent to benefit the subject, but
even her motive-based account of paternalism requires an intent to remove a certain matter
from someone else’s sphere of control. I argue that even this intention is not necessary. Shif-
frin, supra note 4, at 217.
55. The Supreme Court sometimes misses this point. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (“Some activities may be such an irrational
object of disfavor that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively
or predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily be
presumed. A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews. But opposition to voluntary abortion
cannot possibly be considered such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism
towards) women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common
and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or
indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class—as is evident from the fact that men and
women are on both sides of the issue.”). The fact that a policy may not be intended to insult
women does not mean that it is not insulting to women.
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There is a third, but related, reason to reject an intent-based account of
the wrongness of paternalism. Paternalism often applies most pointedly to
actions for which it is difficult to ascribe any definite intention. Although it
is used to describe individual actions, paternalism is especially prominent as
a criticism of government action.56 We criticize laws and policies, rules and
regulations, as being paternalistic. Though by no means exclusively, pater-
nalism is importantly a charge leveled against government policies.
Whatever its content, then, paternalism must be a concept that can apply to
government policies.
It is, however, notoriously difficult to ascribe a single intention to a law
or other government action.57 A law or government policy choice will usu-
ally be the result of many different individual actors, who may all have
slightly or extremely different reasons for their actions. In this situation, it
will be difficult, if not incoherent, to speak of an intention behind the ac-
tion. Moreover, individual legislators may not be acting on policy reasons at
all, but rather on reasons deriving from their institutional role. A legislator
may vote for a law based on the belief that it is what the constituents want,
or that it will get the legislator reelected, or that it is constitutionally re-
quired. Such beliefs can hardly constitute the intention behind the law.
These difficulties with identifying a collective intent create problems for
a theory of paternalism that relies on intent. For example, consider a law
requiring that all motorcyclists wear helmets. Is that law paternalistic? The
intent-based approach would inquire into why the law was created. But there
may be no single answer to this question. Some legislators may be moved by
motorcyclists’ well-being—thinking helmetless riders to be irrational and in
need of protection. Others may want only to reduce the state healthcare
costs. Others yet may be moved by a generous donation from the helmet
manufacturers. And some may act based on what a majority of their constit-
uents support, each of whom in turn may have a different motivation. And
legislators may be moved by different combinations of these ideas. In this
situation, it seems hopeless to identify a single intention and, on this basis,
to classify the law as paternalistic or not.
It might be tempting to appeal to some idea of contribution here: if the
paternalistic reasons contribute to the passage of the law, then the law is
objectionably paternalistic. For example, if the helmet law would not pass
without the reasons based on protecting motorcyclists from themselves, then
the law is paternalistic.58 This response is ultimately fruitless. In addition to
56. See, e.g., Valenti, supra note 5; Mali, supra note 5.
57. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 317–27 (1986) (describing the impossibility
of identifying a single intention behind a legislative act); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870–71 (1930) (arguing that a notion of a collective intent is incoherent
because it is virtually impossible that a group of legislators will all have the same discernible
intent); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have intentions and purpose and
motives; collections of individuals do not. To pretend otherwise is fanciful.”).
58. There is another way to make sense of contribution. One might consider not whether
the paternalistic votes were necessary to the passage of the law but whether there were any at
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introducing a seemingly unknowable counterfactual, the response produces
incorrect results for an intent-based approach. If every legislator voted based
on a desire to save motorcyclists from themselves, that would seem to be a
paradigmatic example of paternalism. But it might be the case that, even
without this reason, the law would be enacted for other reasons such as the
healthcare costs. As soon as the analysis shifts from actual intention to hypo-
thetical intention, the intent-based approach loses its appeal.
Even if there were some way to translate the intentions of the separate
legislators into a single collective intention behind the law, a further prob-
lem exists. Above, I noted the general problems with thinking that permissi-
bility depends on intention. The basic point was that permissibility is
directly about the reasons for or against an action, not about the intention
behind the action. This point is heightened in the collective choice context,
where the deliberation process is even more disconnected from the “inten-
tion” with which the action or policy is adopted.59 Paternalism is supposed
to be a normatively significant concept. If a law is paternalistic, that should
counsel legislators against enacting it. But this is not possible if a law’s status
as paternalistic depends on the reasons for enacting it.
For example, imagine a legislator is considering whether to vote for the
motorcycle helmet law. A constituent asks her not to vote for it because it is
paternalistic. How is the legislator supposed to assess this argument? Should
her vote depend on what she thinks will be the basis for other people’s
votes? This would be strange, especially since other legislators might be go-
ing through the same assessment. It seems like the legislator’s decision about
whether the law is a good one should depend on the reasons for and against
the law itself, not on what reasons will motivate a selection of the policy.
If paternalism is to play this role—as something that counts against a
policy choice itself—then it cannot be contingent on the manner in which
the policy choice is enacted.60 To capture paternalism’s normative content,
an account is required in which paternalism inheres in the action or policy
itself.
III. Expressive Content
I want to suggest that what gives paternalism its normative character is
its expressive content. This thesis can be stated fairly simply. Paternalistic
all, necessary or not. The trouble with this view is that it would mean that a completely
unnecessary vote could make a law paternalistic.
59. See, e.g., Shepsle, supra note 57, at 245 (arguing that committee versions of bills skew
deliberations in a way that renders them disconnected from legislators’ actual intentions).
60. It is not impossible to imagine a situation in which a legislator would be moved by
the expected motivations of other legislators, but such a situation provides a useful contrast.
Suppose that a legislator believes that a proposed law is motivated by political gamesmanship.
She might, in such a case, vote against the law because she refuses to participate in such an
action, even though she thinks the law itself is a good one. Note that voting against a paternal-
istic law is not like this. That a law is paternalistic counts as a reason why it is not a good law,
not simply as a reason to avoid voting for it.
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actions imply that the actor knows better than the subject with regard to a
matter within the subject’s sphere of control, and paternalistic actions are
impermissible insofar as this expression is offensive. That is, paternalism is
impermissible to the extent that it expresses something insulting.
Whether any given instance of paternalism is insulting, it turns out, de-
pends on a variety of context-specific factors. In some contexts, individuals
should not feel insulted by limited paternalism. In other contexts, the ex-
pressive account offers the tools to explain otherwise perplexing complaints
of paternalism. And when the government is the actor, that introduces an
array of additional contextual factors. After introducing the expressive ap-
proach, the balance of this Part examines the influence of these different
contextual factors.
A. The Expressive Account of Paternalism
Actions express things. In the most transparent cases, the expressive
content of an action may be explicit and intended. For example, the move-
ment of a ballet dancer may express sadness or joy,61 and burning a draft
card may express one’s opposition to the draft.62 Often, however, the expres-
sive content will be more implicit, ambiguous, or even unintended. For ex-
ample, giving advice might express a perceived superiority or a thoughtful
caring; wearing an unusual outfit might express a defiance of custom or
disrespect for one’s host. The point is that actions, like words, can mean
things—and these meanings can be multifarious, subtle, and unintended.
Actions of the state, including the passage of particular laws, are no excep-
tion; they too can be expressive.63 For example, punishing an offender may
express the community’s disdain for a criminal’s actions;64 zoning ordi-
nances may express a vision of what a community wants to look like;65 so-
called “sin taxes” may express the idea that certain activities constitute moral
61. See Judith Snyder Jaffe, The Expressive Meaning of a Dance, 12 J. Aesthetics & Art
Criticism 518 (1954).
62. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
63. This idea has been discussed in the legal context. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive
Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 (1996).
64. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 Monist 397, 398–99
(1965); see also Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 103, 114–15 (2001); cf. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy of Law 9 (1968) (discussing how retribution is the application of the pains of
punishment to an offender who is morally guilty).
65. Cf. Fairlawns Cemetery Ass’n v. Zoning Comm’n, 86 A.2d 74, 77 (Conn. 1952)
(holding that zoning ordinances must be “expressive of a plan which is comprehensive”).
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vices.66 As with individual actions, state actions can have implicit, complex,
or unintended meanings.67
My claim is that actions, including state actions, are paternalistic when
they express the idea that the actor knows better than the person acted upon
regarding something that is normally within that person’s sphere of con-
trol.68 For example, if I try to induce you to eat healthier foods, this counts
as paternalism because it expresses the idea that I know what is good for you
better than you do. If a law requires motorcyclists to wear helmets, this is
paternalistic because it expresses the idea that the government knows better
than motorcyclists what is good for them. The basic idea is that paternalistic
actions are those that express the idea that the actor knows better than the
other person.
On its own, however, this expressive content isn’t sufficient. One
wouldn’t call the action of yelling “I know better than you” an act of pater-
nalism. Paternalism also requires at least the superficial appearance of pro-
viding aid. Reasonable perception seems to be the important thing here, not
intent. If I try to kill you with the genuine intention to send you to heaven,
this would not seem like paternalism because a reasonable person would
count this as providing aid. Thus, a more precise analysis would be some-
thing like: A’s action X is paternalistic toward B if and only if X involves A
providing some (not necessarily net) benefit to B and X implicitly expresses
the claim that A knows better than B what will benefit B.69
This is a descriptive account of paternalism—paternalism involves ac-
tions that express a certain view about the person acted upon. Paternalism’s
normative significance flows naturally from this description. What makes
paternalism generally objectionable is that its expressive content is generally
objectionable. It is usually insulting to be told that you do not know best
with regard to your own matters.70 When we confront paternalistic actions
66. Cf. Francesca Barigozzi & Bertrand Villeneuve, The Signaling Effect of Tax Policy, 8 J.
Pub. Econ. Theory 611, 611 (2006) (modeling the use of taxes to communicate to citizens the
effects of certain actions).
67. For an excellent study of how a law can have significant expressive content beyond
the particular sanction it imposes, see Adriaan Lanni, The Expressive Effect of the Athenian
Prostitution Laws, 29 Classical Antiquity 45 (2010).
68. Sometimes, paternalism is directed more at the other party’s willpower than the
party’s judgment. That is, sometimes it may aim to prevent weaknesses of will. In such cases,
the paternalism doesn’t express the idea that the other party doesn’t know what’s good for her
as much as it expresses that the other party is dysfunctional as an agent. I will generally talk in
terms of “knowing better,” but I mean to include cases in which what is expressed is that one
is better as an agent.
69. I have put this in terms of benefit, but the idea might be modified to incorporate
Shiffrin’s point about control rather than benefit. On that view, the account would be: A’s
action X is paternalistic toward B if and only if X involves A interfering with B’s control and X
implicitly expresses the claim that A knows better than B with regard to the matter at issue. See
Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 216–18.
70. The observation that paternalism involves an insult is not a new one. See, e.g., de
Marneffe, supra note 8, at 68 (“Paternalism seems repugnant because it seems infantilizing. In
limiting our liberty for our own good, it seems that the government treats us like children.”);
de Marneffe, supra note 31, at 72 (“The thought that paternalism is wrong is closely tied to the
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or policies, our objection is based on what those actions or policies say
about us. Thus, the objectionable feature of paternalism is not the nature of
the interference (which is more or less coercive), nor the intention behind
the interference, but rather what is expressed by that interference.
It is, of course, true that more forceful intervention will frequently be a
statement of even greater superiority in judging one’s welfare. So for this
reason (and because the potential for injury is greater), forceful coercion will
often seem more objectionable than gentler nudging. But it is not simply
how coercive an act of paternalism is that dictates whether it is objectiona-
ble, but rather how much respect it shows to the subject.
To put the point another way, the expressive account recognizes that free
choice is often important for its symbolic value—it reflects respect for the
chooser. Libertarians claim to be moved by the value of liberty—that is, of
having control over their own lives. But there are different reasons for valu-
ing choice.71 One reason is instrumental: having choices will often allow me
to better pursue my own well-being. Thaler and Sunstein show, however,
that uninfluenced choice will sometimes work against this instrumental
value.72 My choices will sometimes have more instrumental value if they are
made under favorable conditions, such as those constructed by a good
choice architect. But there are other reasons for valuing the ability to choose.
In particular, my ability to make choices may be valuable as an indication of
the respect others have for me. It is this value that the expressive theory says
is harmed in cases of paternalism. And whether the symbolic value of choice
is undermined does not necessarily correspond with the degree of coercion
involved. As the examples above are meant to suggest, coercion sometimes
will not symbolize an insulting assertion of superiority, and mere choice
structuring sometimes will.
The expressive account thus begins to explain why details and context
matter so much to paternalism. It is because the meaning of any expression
varies greatly depending on context. The statement “I/We know better than
you what’s good for you” is more offensive in some contexts than in others.
In some contexts, it may even be acceptable. Similarly, the impermissibility
of a paternalistic action will depend heavily on the context. This dependence
explains the pair of spousal interventions described previously.73 In the first
example, the paternalism is forceful but isolated. It assertively implies that
the party knows best on this occasion. But importantly, it does not express
thought that there is something disrespectful about it, that it is disrespectful to coerce another
adult on the assumption that he’s mistaken about what’s best for him.”); Husak, supra note 38,
at 41 (“[T]he individual acting paternalistically towards another claims superiority by denying
the autonomy of the person so treated.” (quoting Arthur White, Paternalism 73–74 (1974)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia)); Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 220
(“[P]aternalism delivers a special sort of insult to competent, autonomous agents.”).
71. See T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 251–56 (1998); T.M. Scanlon,
Jr., The Significance of Choice, in 8 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 149, 149–216
(Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1988).
72. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9.
73. See supra Section I.C.
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wholesale superiority of judgment. When someone’s actions generally ex-
press respect for your autonomy, an isolated intervention may seem benign.
General or widespread disrespect, in contrast, is precisely what makes the
second relationship seem objectionable. Even if a friend or spouse doesn’t
ever force you to do anything, her actions can express the view that you
cannot choose well for yourself.
Furthermore, the background relationship and particular facts about the
intervention make an enormous difference. In the spousal examples, it mat-
ters that the coercive actor is a spouse. This is not because spouses have
some sort of permission to coerce each other. Rather, the context matters
because it implies a background of love and respect. If this is a good mar-
riage, then the partners respect each other in a way that is compatible with
acknowledging each other’s particular failings. In the first smoking exam-
ple,74 it matters that the friend is a fellow smoker, because that blunts the
implication of general superiority of judgment. For this reason, the same
behavior from a nonsmoker might be objectionably paternalistic. And in
each case, it matters that the implied failing is human and that the liberty
being restricted is not one of great symbolic significance.75 One could go on,
but, in short, an action’s impermissibility on grounds of paternalism de-
pends on context, in the same way that an uttered sentence may be more or
less objectionable depending on the context in which it is uttered.76
B. Expression and Justification
The expressive theory holds that paternalism is characterized by what it
expresses and not by the intent of the actor. In this Section, I want to ex-
plore a complexity that arises in this distinction. The complexity arises be-
cause the meaning expressed by an action may sometimes depend on the
available justifications for it. As a result, inquiring what an action expresses
will sometimes involve inquiring how it can be justified. This bears a strong
74. See supra note 37.
75. See de Marneffe, supra note 8, at 68 (“In limiting our liberty for our own good, it
seems that the government treats us like children or that it impedes our development into fully
mature adults, but there is no reason to think this is true of every paternalistic policy. Some
liberties have a special value in symbolizing the status of adulthood within our society, the
freedom to marry, for example. . . . Not every liberty, though, has this kind of significance: the
freedom to drive without a seatbelt does not. So there is little reason to think that every
paternalistic policy is infantilizing in this way.”). Overall, I am quite sympathetic with de
Marneffe, but I think his focus on the type of liberty involved is too narrow. The particular
liberty being infringed is, in my view, only one among many factors that determine whether
the particular example of paternalism is actually objectionably insulting to one’s agency.
76. In making this point, I disagree with Hausman and Welch’s claim that, “[u]nlike
constraining someone or substituting your judgment for theirs, providing information and
giving advice treats individuals as fully competent decision makers.” Hausman & Welch, supra
note 34, at 127. Even merely providing advice or information can count as objectionably pa-
ternalistic. If you don’t believe me, try going to your nearest McDonald’s and politely inform-
ing everyone in line of the nutritional information regarding their diets. Whether giving advice
or information is perfectly respectful of another or not will depend on context. See George
Tsai, Rational Persuasion as Paternalism, 42 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 78 (2014).
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resemblance to an inquiry into intent, but it is crucially different—the ques-
tion of available justification does not involve examining the subjective mo-
tivation of the actor.
The general point—that meaning depends on available justification—is
not terribly hard to grasp. When one friend laments, “Sally never called me
back; I guess that means she isn’t interested in me,” and the other friend
responds, “I don’t think it means that. I saw her two days ago and she said
that she was having her wisdom teeth pulled out yesterday,” the exchange
involves interpreting the meaning of an action (or inaction, in this case)
against a backdrop of available justifications. In this case, Sally might not
have called because she’s not interested (subjective motivation), but her fail-
ure to call doesn’t express that. And the asymmetry can run in the opposite
direction as well—that is, a lack of other available justifications might mean
that my action expresses something that I didn’t really intend. I might think
that showing up to a cocktail party in a pirate costume will be humorous,
but it turns out that this action will express disrespect to my hosts. (It turns
out that “it’s funny” isn’t always a valid justification.) The general point,
then, is that what an action expresses will often depend on what justifica-
tions are available.
For example, Thaler and Sunstein mention daylight saving time as an
example of libertarian paternalism.77 The thought is that by altering the time
settings, the government is nudging us to get out of bed earlier and also to
save energy.78 Of course, we all could get up at 6 a.m. instead of 7 a.m.
during the summer without the time change, but the government gives us a
nudge in this direction—a nudge that isn’t a shove because we can all
choose to get up at the same time in the summer, only now it will be called 8
a.m.
While it certainly is the case that the policy is designed to alter citizens’
behavior in favorable ways, it’s not clear that this is really an example of
paternalism. To see why, one must notice that time is a social mechanism for
coordinating behavior. We use time to synchronize our activities with one
another. Imagine that there was no daylight saving time. An individual
might enjoy the extended daylight hour by shifting her schedule an hour
earlier. But for most people, this would not be possible. If the individual’s
employer hires her 9:00–5:00, she cannot just decide to work 8:00–4:00.
What’s more, many or most people might be in the same situation—want-
ing to change schedules, but constrained by others. It would be a classic
coordination problem. By establishing daylight saving time, the government
provides a solution.79
77. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 47.
78. Id.
79. Cf. Fotion, supra note 27, at 197 (“Providing police and military protection for the
citizens on this analysis would not fall under the aegis of the paternalistic model, since one
could not expect a person on his own ever to provide these services for himself. Nor would
most regulatory functions of the state be classed as paternalistic.”).
1320 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1295
But why does the existence of a coordination problem mean that the
policy isn’t really paternalism? After all, the government is implementing a
policy to encourage people to act in their own best interests. Isn’t the gov-
ernment saying to us, in a sense, “Without our help, you will adopt sched-
ules that are to your disadvantage”? To see why the policy is not
paternalistic, consider the justification that can be offered to a particular
citizen. Because of the coordination problem, the government policy does
not rely on the idea that the citizen is unable to judge his own interests. If a
citizen asks, “What makes you [government] think that I don’t know what is
best for me?” then the government has a response: “We aren’t denying that
you know what’s best for you, but in this case you (and everyone else) can’t
do it on your own—and that’s why we’re helping.” In other words, the coor-
dination problem means that the government need not justify its action on
the premise that individuals don’t know what’s best for them. It does rely on
the idea that we (collectively) wouldn’t do what’s best for us without gov-
ernment intervention. But this latter premise, unlike the former, contains
nothing offensive to the values of autonomy. That is, it doesn’t imply that
we are incapable of governing our own lives.
As this example illustrates, some government policies that seek to in-
duce the citizenry to act in ways that will serve its own interests will not
count as paternalism. When Thaler and Sunstein use the term “libertarian
paternalism,” they sometimes seem to include any such policy.80 But many
times, these policies aren’t forms of paternalism that are justifiable because
they are libertarian. Rather, they aren’t paternalism at all.
Such policies aren’t paternalism because, given the available justifica-
tions, the policies don’t express a judgment that citizens cannot make good
decisions for themselves,81 even though the government’s intent82 was pater-
nalistic. Solving a coordination problem is a classic justification for govern-
ment intervention. It is not paternalism when the government tells us which
side of the road to drive on because this isn’t justified by any sense that
individuals are inadequate, but rather by a sense that individual actions need
to be coordinated in order to overcome a collective action problem. It is
coercive action that benefits individuals, but it is not justified by the idea
that individuals cannot judge what is best for them.
80. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 6 (arguing that a libertarian paternalistic
policy is any policy that attempts to move people in directions that will make their lives better,
without forbidding any options or substantially changing their economic incentives).
81. The subtle difference between this and the claim that requiring motorcycle helmets
isn’t paternalism is that this is done to reduce public health expenses. See supra Section II.A.
The difference, though, is that in the collective action example, the available response can be,
“We don’t distrust your judgment at all. You just can’t do it on your own.” Whereas the
available response in the motorcycle case doesn’t actually seem to cancel the implication that
the parties will make bad choices—it seems to be saying, “We only care about your bad
choices because they affect the rest of us,” which is quite a bit more abrasive. This contrast
illuminates the difference between an express account and an intent-based account. The mo-
torcycle policy may not be based on a paternalistic intention, but it is still paternalism because
of its outward character.
82. Whatever that would mean. See supra Section II.C.
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An expressive account of paternalism will sometimes have to ask why a
particular action or policy is pursued. But it asks that question to interpret
the meaning of an action, not as an inquiry into intent. This is the difference
between objective and subjective justification. In many cases of paternalism,
the objective justification for the action will be that someone is not able to
judge what is best for herself. In cases of objectionable paternalism, an ac-
tion may be insulting because no noninsulting justification is readily
available.83
C. Humility and Permissible Paternalism
The expressive theory of paternalism descriptively categorizes certain ac-
tions and policies as paternalistic based on what they express. Because this
expressive content is potentially insulting, the theory explains why paternal-
ism is a prima facie reason against pursuing an action or policy. But this will
be true only in general. The expressive theory of paternalism explains how
some instances of paternalism are permissible. The answer is that some ex-
pressions of our limitations as agents need not be insulting.
One of the powerful elements of Thaler and Sunstein’s argument is the
use of behavioral economics to convincingly cast aside John Stuart Mill’s
bizarre libertarian premise that we are always the best judges of our own
well-being.84 Although we probably didn’t need behavioral economics to see
it, there can be little doubt that we are all routinely mistaken in our judg-
ments about what is good for us.
On the basis of this humility, we should be willing to accept some im-
plicit questioning or criticisms of our judgment. If my friend gives me a CD
of music that I profess to dislike and tells me that I will enjoy it if I try, I
should be willing to think that maybe my judgment was clouded. If my wife
starts forcing me to eat healthier foods now and then, I need not immedi-
ately object that I know what’s best for me.85 Although in both cases the
83. For example, Justice Stevens argued against restrictions on truthful commercial
speech. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(“Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to pro-
tect consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive
assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth.”). When Justice Stevens says
that the bans rest on the “offensive assumption” about the public, he is making a point about
what justifications are available for the law, not about what in fact motivated its adoption. His
point is that no nonoffensive justification is available. Of course, this is not to say that Stevens
is right in saying that the existing justification is offensive. Denying that more information is
always better for consumers might not be all that offensive, especially in light of the behavioral
weaknesses like those Thaler and Sunstein highlight. See supra Section I.A.
84. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 19 (“[The fact of systematic error]
does not mean something is wrong with us as humans, but it does mean that our understand-
ing of human behavior can be improved by appreciating how people systematically go
wrong. . . . Knowing something about the cognitive system has allowed others to discover
systematic biases in the way we think.”).
85. This example has many similarities to Husak’s argument that paternalistic interven-
tion may be acceptable if a vice is shared and that, as a result, “it would be peculiar to say
that . . . paternalistic treatment betrayed a lack of respect for me, or was evidence of [an]
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action calls into question my judgment about my own well-being in a par-
ticular matter, the implication does not seem offensive in either case. It
would, of course, be totally different if a stranger approached me on the
street and informed me that I would look so much better if I refrained from
wearing pleated pants. Or if a customer next to me at the cafe´ were to sug-
gest that I eat healthier foods. But many, if not most, criticisms of our judg-
ment will not be so offensive.
For this reason, the standard libertarian’s categorical objection to pater-
nalism per se strikes me as a bit arrogant. It is as though every instance of
paternalism were an impertinent stranger on the street. If some person or
institution prods you in ways that are thought to make you better off, it
indicates a lack of humility to respond immediately in knee-jerk fashion.
Perhaps I can benefit from the government telling me to wear a motorcycle
helmet, just as I can benefit from my wife telling me to eat some vegetables.
Of course, if my wife or the government is persistently nagging me about all
sorts of things, then I have every right to object. But humility, I think, coun-
sels against thinking that every single instance of paternalism is
objectionable.86
In a way, this argument for paternalism is a variation on the problem-
atic but frequently pursued argument from consent. A number of scholars
have argued in favor of some degree of paternalism on the grounds that
individuals would, or should, consent to it.87 One can see the appeal of this
argument. The classic example is Odysseus instructing his sailors to bind
him to the mast of the ship so that he would not succumb to the calls of the
Sirens. The constraint doesn’t really seem objectionable because Odysseus
requested that he be constrained. If other forms of paternalism have this
attitude of moral superiority.” Husak, supra note 38, at 45. I share Husak’s intuitions. But
Husak defends only the weaker position that paternalism may be permissible where there is no
implication of superiority or shortcoming. I think this line of thought goes further. In my
view, permissible paternalism may imply superiority of judgment or a shortcoming on the
part of the subject. This is because limited assertions of superiority (“I have less of a sweet
tooth than you”) or limited assertions of shortcomings (“Baked goods are your great vice”) are
still compatible with overall respect and equality. Paternalism becomes objectionable not when
it implies superiority, but when it begins to imply wholesale superiority.
86. See de Marneffe, supra note 8, at 80 (“Errors in practical judgment are normal,
though, whether they are about what is best for oneself or about what is best all things consid-
ered. So the supposition that someone is wrong about what is best for him with respect to a
particular decision does not imply that he is stupid. It implies only that his rationality is
imperfect, and so is open to the kinds of error we all are.”). In this regard, I am in total
solidarity with de Marneffe; de Marneffe, however, focuses only on the type of liberty involved.
87. E.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 219 (rev. ed. 1999) (“It is also rational for
[the parties] to protect themselves against their own irrational inclinations by consenting to a
scheme of penalties that may give them a sufficient motive to avoid foolish actions and by
accepting certain impositions designed to undo the unfortunate consequences of their impru-
dent behavior.”); Dworkin, supra note 40, at 119 (“Parental paternalism may be thought of as
a wager by the parent on the child’s subsequent recognition of the wisdom of the restrictions.
There is an emphasis on what could be called future-oriented consent—on what the child will
come to welcome, rather than on what he does welcome.”).
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character, then they might be permissible. The trick, then, is to show how
typical cases of paternalism are justified based on consent.
The difficulty for such accounts is that they inevitably rely on some
notion of quasi or implied consent. But part of what makes typical paternal-
ism coercive is that we don’t consent to it. Perhaps we should, or perhaps we
would under more ideal conditions, but it’s not clear that this is enough to
generate permissibility.
The argument from humility, as I will call it, does not try to argue that
parties should or would consent to the paternalism. Rather, the argument
claims that parties cannot reasonably reject the paternalism. If some party
makes me do something because it will be in my own interest and this inter-
ference is relatively benign—i.e., it doesn’t impugn my judgment or threaten
my autonomy more generally—then it may be arrogant for me to object
that I know what’s best for myself.88 That is, if the paternalism is appropri-
ately benign, then what makes it permissible is not that I consent to it—
which I do not—but rather that I cannot reasonably complain about it. It’s
not that some instances of paternalism are consented to, but rather that
some instances of paternalism are unobjectionable.89
I don’t want to overstate the point. Many examples of paternalism are
objectionable. They are objectionable because they are insulting. And they
are insulting because they imply that we cannot judge for ourselves what is
in our own interests. The point that I am making, however, is that not every
implied criticism of our judgment should be taken as an insult. Sometimes
88. It is worth contrasting this argument with the argument that Duncan Kennedy
makes for paternalism. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982). Kennedy argues that paternalism may be justified by appealing to the
Marxist idea of false consciousness. Id. at 572. While the recognition that we may be systemati-
cally mistaken about our own interests is an important aspect of any defense of paternalism—
the present account, Thaler and Sunstein, and Kennedy all share that characteristic—the ap-
peal to false consciousness seems like the wrong tactic. By focusing on the capacities of the
chooser, Kennedy makes the same mistake as the antipaternalist. What is important is not
whether the chooser actually is suffering from false consciousness. What is important is that
our general recognition of the possibility of false consciousness means that intervention is not
per se insulting. Kennedy seems to think that whether paternalism is permissible depends on
whether the person actually is suffering from false consciousness—whether an intervention
will make things better for that person. See, e.g., id. at 641. In my view, this is not true and the
focus on capacity is mistaken. Even if an intervention does not make things better, even if the
person did know what was best, the possibility that they didn’t know should keep them from
necessarily objecting to any intervention. And, on the flipside, the expressive account leaves
room that one might be objectionably paternalistic toward someone who definitely lacks the
capacity to choose—for example, when one assists a mentally handicapped person or a child
in a manner that is overly condescending or stigmatizing.
89. Recent empirical work by Sunita Sah, Dena Gromet, and Richard Larrick suggests
that, in fact, people are less likely to find nudges objectionable if their own weaknesses are
made salient to them. Sunita Sah et al., Transparent Nudges: How Knowledge of a Nudge Can
Increase Its Acceptability (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). That is, when we
recognize our own failings, we are more likely to tolerate instances of paternalism.
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we should acknowledge that perhaps we don’t know best.90 As Thaler and
Sunstein, like so many others, point out, the evidence is pretty good that
we’re not great at making judgments for ourselves in a whole range of con-
texts.91 For this reason, raising the libertarian battle cry against any instance
of paternalism is a sort of blind overconfidence.
D. Truth and Insults
In the previous section, I drew on the expressive understanding of pa-
ternalism to suggest that the appropriateness of humility eliminates the ob-
jection to some cases of paternalism. In the next three Sections, I turn to the
opposite thought, namely that the expressive account can explain objections
to paternalism that might otherwise seem perplexing.
First, the expressive approach explains why even empirically well-sup-
ported paternalism may be objectionable. I have suggested that paternalism
is impermissible if it insultingly expresses the idea that the paternalist knows
better than the subject. At this point, the libertarian paternalist might be
tempted to respond by simply saying, “But we (or some other policymakers)
do know better than you do. You are irrational—just like the rest of us.” And
this may be true. One might point to the vast array of psychology studies
that show our systematic irrationalities. Saying that detached policymakers
know better might just be honest.
Honesty, however, does not immunize one from having committed an
insult. Unlike in libel law, truth is not a complete defense. This is not hard to
see. If a stranger on the street blurts out that I dress poorly or that I am
overweight, I need not dispute the truth of the statement in order to have an
objection to it. Even truthful statements can still be insults.
This might sound a bit irrational. Uncharitably, it seems like the only
objection would involve saying, “It’s true, but don’t say it out loud.” Put this
way, the objection does seem odd. But it doesn’t need to be put quite like
that. One might say that showing respect for someone requires looking past
his or her failings or imperfections, or at least not publicly asserting them.
90. I think the argument from humility relates to another argument for paternalism that
I find somewhat convincing. This argument points out that there is a distributive aspect of
paternalism—that some people, through no fault of their own, are more apt to make poor
choices. Arneson, supra note 8, at 274–75. When this distributive dimension is considered, I
think a blanket objection to paternalism looks even less persuasive. That is, I should be hum-
ble about the fact that I may be a bad decisionmaker in this context, and even if I am a good
decisionmaker, I should be reticent to object to a policy that may help others. I disagree here
with Kennedy, who claims that “[f]or an intervention to be paternalist, the distributive effects
have to be ‘side effects’ rather than the purpose of the initiative.” Kennedy, supra note 88, at
625. The claim that Kennedy makes here is representative of the problems with intent-based
theories of paternalism.
91. Ryan Bubb & Richard Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127
Harv. L. Rev. 1593, 1595 (2014) (pointing out that there is a significant tension between the
evidence from behavioral economics and the emphasis placed on noncoercive policy propos-
als). “[I]t would be surprising if the main policy implication of the mounting evidence docu-
menting the failure of individual choice was a turn toward regulatory instruments that
preserve individual choice.” Id.
June 2015] A Third Theory of Paternalism 1325
One wouldn’t dare, for example, tell the Queen of England that she has a
stain on her clothes. It might be true, but to express it would be disrespect-
ful. Similarly, the truth-telling stranger is being disrespectful.
The objection to paternalism may be similar. After all, the antipaternal-
ist may not object to the truth of the statement that others know better, but
rather to its expression through the policy. That the paternalist does, in fact,
know better may not matter. The antipaternalist, we might analogously im-
agine, knows that he is irrational like any other human being, but finds it
disrespectful when other people (or the government) thrust this fact back in
his face.
But cast this way, as has already been suggested, the antipaternalist will
sometimes seem a bit too proud. This is where the argument from humility
kicks in. “You make mistakes” should not always be taken as an insulting
assertion of superiority. Sometimes it’s just honest, and that shouldn’t
bother us. But not because honesty is always unobjectionable. And thus even
empirically grounded paternalism may be problematic.
E. Inevitability and Expression
Some argue that paternalism is a more pervasive aspect of life than we
generally appreciate, and that this is a reason to favor it.92 Thaler and Sun-
stein repeatedly assert that affecting choice architecture is inevitable.93 Be-
cause a cafeteria must arrange the foods one way or another, it will
unavoidably influence its customers’ food choices. As a result, genuinely
neutral noninterference is impossible. And if shaping the choice architecture
is inevitable, then, the argument goes, shaping it in the best interests of the
chooser should be unobjectionable. No matter what we do, we’re going to
influence people’s choices, so why not do it in a way that is in their best
interests?
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the potentially
objectionable feature of paternalism is that decisions are being influenced.
From Thaler and Sunstein’s perspective, the potential objection has the
form: “You’re trying to influence what choices I make.” And to this objec-
tion, they imagine the response, “We can’t help but influence what choices
you make, so we’re trying to do so in as helpful a way as we can.”94 In a
92. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 88, at 645–46 (“The single most important piece in the
quilt of arguments in favor of ad hoc paternalism is the pervasiveness of compulsory terms, in
contract, in tort and in statutory schemes. . . . Paternalism everywhere, coming out of the
woodwork, suggests that the satisfying clarity of one’s initial anti-paternalist reaction is made
possible only by excluding most of the problem from consideration.”).
93. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 8, at 1164 (“The first misconception is that there
are viable alternatives to paternalism. In many situations, some organization or agent must
make a choice that will affect the behavior of some other people. There is, in those situations,
no alternative to a kind of paternalism—at least in the form of an intervention that affects
what people choose.”).
94. This argument is based on the famous ought-implies-can principle. The imagined
objector says, “You ought not affect my choices.” Thaler and Sunstein respond, “We cannot
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sense, they reject the possibility of the idealized libertarian fantasy of com-
plete noninterference.
But this is not persuasive if the actual objection to paternalism is of a
different bent. If the objector isn’t concerned with the interference itself, but
rather with what is expressed by the interference, then it’s a whole different
ball game. If the critic objects not to the fact that choices are being influ-
enced, but rather to the way that choices are being influenced, then the inev-
itability of influencing choices is relatively insignificant.95
For example, suppose the antipaternalist objects to the cafeteria’s effort
to get people to eat healthier foods. Thaler and Sunstein respond by noting
that there is no “neutral” option available—no matter how the cafeteria ar-
ranges the food, it will affect what choices people make. But, drawing on the
expressive approach, the antipaternalist may respond, “That’s fine. I under-
stand that my choices will be affected one way or another. But don’t go
around making it seem like you know what’s best for me. Arrange the foods
in the way that is easiest for you. Or randomly. What I object to is your
saying that you know better than I do.” We should take this objection
seriously.
Understanding paternalism in terms of expressive content offers the
tools to make objections like this seem intelligible. Framed in this way, the
antipaternalist has a reasonable objection that withstands the inevitability of
interfering with parties’ choices. The complaint about paternalism is not
that it interferes with our lives per se, but that it expresses disrespect for us
as decisionmakers.
F. Singling Out
As I have already argued, the expressive theory of paternalism explains
why certain instances of paternalism are not objectionable and why other
instances are objectionable. In this way, I believe the theory is better
equipped to account for the ways in which the concept of paternalism is
deployed in actual discourse. The expressive theory does justice to our actual
use of the concept. To further support this claim, I explore how the expres-
sive theory of paternalism makes sense of our heightened sensitivity to pa-
ternalism that singles out particular individuals or groups.
Recall the nudge puzzle: how can a less restrictive policy be more objec-
tionable? In George Eliot’s Middlemarch, Edward Casaubon leaves his estate
to his wife, Dorothea, with the unique provision that she loses her entire
inheritance if she marries Will Ladislaw.96 This provision proves to be a
not affect you choices.” With the implicit ought-implies-can premise, this is taken to refute the
imagined objector.
95. Cf. Jamie Kelly, Libertarian Paternalism, Utilitarianism, and Justice, in Paternalism:
Theory and Practice, supra note 31, at 216, 219 (“[Thaler and Sunstein] appear to be run-
ning together two claims here: The first is the claim that some sort of influence is inevitable;
the second is that the appropriate response must be paternalistic.”).
96. 3 George Eliot, Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life 113 (1872).
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source of great injury to both Dorothea and Ladislaw.97 But it is, one will
note, simply a strong nudge. There was nothing requiring Casaubon to leave
his estate to his wife, regardless of future remarriage.98 It is a benefit contin-
gent on certain conduct. The provision is a biting injury, however, because it
singles out only a future union with Ladislaw. What might not have been
insulting as a general paternalistic nudge becomes deeply insulting when it
singles out a particular individual. The singling out creates an altogether
different expressive content.
I have suggested that a government’s policy expressing the inferiority of
individual decisionmaking might be objectionably paternalistic, even if the
policy is not directly coercive. One way that this may occur is when a gov-
ernment policy singles out a particular set of citizens. That is, one conse-
quence of the view I am defending—one that I think matches our
intuitions—is that government paternalism that picks out a particular sub-
set of the citizenry (for example, the poor or the Native American) is more
apt to be objectionably paternalistic. When a democratic government enacts
a general paternalistic policy—for example, seatbelt laws—then at least all
citizens are treated the same. And if the government generally respects the
autonomy of its citizens, then one or another discrete exceptions may be
seen as simply a recognition of certain limited failings that we all have.
But when a government policy singles out a certain group for regulation,
then the risk of expressing an objectionable lack of respect is significantly
higher. This is especially true when the group is already disadvantaged99
or marginalized.100 Attempted protection can, in this way, become
97. Id. at 207–24.
98. It is perhaps noteworthy that Dorothea does have a sufficient fortune to live on,
albeit more modest than Casaubon’s. See 1 Eliot, supra note 96, at 5.
99. See Dennis F. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office 150–51 (1987)
(“Inequalities that are initially quite independent of the paternalistic intervention may come to
affect its character, and it may in turn reinforce the inequalities. Even if itself isolated or
sporadic, the intervention can generate paternalistic effects that persist in time and spread in
social space . . . .”).
100. While traditionally disadvantaged groups like women, the poor, or racial minorities
are especially likely to be relevant, other groups may also feel the sting of paternalism in this
way. Consider a penetrating exchange in NBC’s The West Wing:
Sam Seaborn: “I am so off-the-charts tired of the gun lobby tossing around words like
personal freedom and nobody calling them on it. It’s not about personal freedom and it
certainly has nothing to do with public safety; it’s just that some people like guns.”
Ainsley Hayes: “Yes, they do. But you know what’s more insidious than that? Your gun
control position doesn’t have anything to do with public safety, and it’s certainly not
about personal freedom. It’s about, you don’t like people who do like guns. You don’t like
the people. Think about that the next time you make a joke about the South.”
The West Wing: In This White House (NBC television broadcast Oct. 25, 2000). Gun safety and
control is, I think, an example in which those who object on grounds of paternalism are not
especially worried that, e.g., mandatory safety locks or waiting periods are especially burden-
some to their personal freedom, but rather are concerned that the policy is insulting to their
values, judgment, and way of life generally.
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This is true whether the paternalism is coercive or not. Like their coer-
cive counterparts, nudges are more likely to be objectionably paternalistic
when they target a particular minority, especially a minority group that may
already think that the government does not adequately respect it. If poor or
minority families find themselves targeted by an array of nudges, they may
reasonably come to view this attention as alienating or disrespectful. For
example, it may be more objectionably paternalistic to target disadvantaged
parents with information about school choice102 than it would be to adopt
the more directly paternalistic policy of increasing the per child expenditures
in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The former implies that poor parents
don’t know how to make good choices for their children, whereas the latter
implies only that the poor need more resources.
The expressive theory of paternalism is equipped to make the charge of
paternalism against such targeted policies intelligible. This concern animates
the arguments against the so-called “new paternalism” exemplified in wel-
fare reform policies.103 For example, government nudges have been charged
with objectionable paternalism due to the requirements associated with the
welfare reform movement. When Congress passed the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”),104 the
major shift was to require welfare recipients to work in order to receive ben-
efits. Among other provisions, adults receiving Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (“TANF”) benefits are required to participate in work activi-
ties within two years after they start receiving assistance under the block
grant.105 Nonexempt adult recipients who are not working must participate
101. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]here can be no doubt that racial pater-
nalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form
of discrimination. So-called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patron-
izing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively,
provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the govern-
ment’s use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause
them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“There can be no doubt
that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally,
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practi-
cal effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” (footnote omitted)).
102. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 204–05 (noting that low-income parents made
“[m]uch better” school choices when provided with a fact sheet with information about test
scores and acceptance rates at available schools).
103. See generally The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty (Law-
rence M. Mead ed., 1997) [hereinafter The New Paternalism] (discussing the trend in wel-
fare policy toward requiring individuals receiving assistance to work or stay in school in
exchange for government aid).
104. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
June 2015] A Third Theory of Paternalism 1329
in community service two months after they start receiving TANF bene-
fits.106 And able-bodied working-age individuals with no dependents must
be working or in work programs to be eligible for food stamps.107 As states
have implemented the law, even more subtle nudges have arisen to discour-
age reliance on welfare—demanding a job search before enrollment,
photographing, fingerprinting, and interrogation.108
While these requirements were at least in part based on a desire to re-
duce public costs, another major rationale was that the work requirements
would actually benefit welfare recipients by channeling them toward em-
ployment and personal responsibility. President Clinton, for example, signed
the bill because it provided a significant benefit to poor Americans: “It gives
us a chance we haven’t had before to break the cycle of dependency that has
existed for millions and millions of our fellow citizens, exiling them from
the world of work [which] gives structure, meaning and dignity to most of
our lives.”109 Newt Gingrich similarly described the reform as an effort to
help welfare recipients:
We were determined to lift the “artificial weights” of a bureaucratic system
of welfare that drained individual initiative and energy and hurt the very
people it was designed to help. In its place, we were determined to clear a
path of work and opportunity that would develop the habits of success that
would lead to self-sufficiency.110
The idea was to create an incentive for needy individuals to do what some
thought would benefit them—namely, enter the workforce.111
Although some leading proponents of welfare reform embraced the
term paternalism,112 one of the major criticisms of the reforms was that they
106. Id. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iv).
107. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2) (2012).
108. See Peter Edelman & Barbara Ehrenreich, Opinion, Why Welfare Reform Fails Its Re-
cession Test, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/04/AR2009120402604.html (“The Urban Institute’s analysis
showed that 42 states have rules that discourage enrollment, such as requiring an extensive job
search, even when there are obviously no jobs to be found. For a person without a car or
access to public transportation, a requirement to apply for dozens of jobs before an application
for welfare will even be considered, as some states and counties mandate, can be a deal-
breaker. In some states, according to Kaaryn Gustafson of the University of Connecticut law
school, ‘applying for welfare is a lot like being booked for a crime.’ There may be a mug shot,
fingerprinting and lengthy interrogations as to the true paternity of one’s children. Word gets
around, and, even in the face of destitution, many people will not undergo such indignities.”).
109. President William Clinton, Announcement on Welfare Legislation (July 31, 1996),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/01/us/text-of-president-clinton-s-announce-
ment-on-welfare-legislation.html.
110. To Review Outcomes of 1996 Welfare Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways
& Means, 109th Cong. 20 (2006) (statement of Newt Gingrich, Founder, Gingrich Group, and
Former Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives.).
111. Gingrich viewed the use of incentives rather than coercion to be an important feature
of the legislation’s appeal. See id. at 23 (“Americans are very responsive to incentives and very
hostile to penalties or punishments.”).
112. See The New Paternalism, supra note 103.
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were objectionably paternalistic.113 From a perspective that focuses on coer-
cion or intent, this criticism may appear unintelligible. The paternalism in-
volved in the government attempting to encourage employment among its
citizens is not, I think, per se objectionable. Only the most zealous anti-
paternalist would, for example, claim that general tax subsidies for adult
education and job training are an impermissible imposition on individual
autonomy. So if the government can generally use incentives to encourage
work, how can one make sense of the charge that welfare reform was objec-
tionably paternalistic?114
The best answer is found in the implicit message that was expressed by
singling out particular groups. Although facially neutral, the implicit mes-
sage of the reform, at least to many ears, was not that we think everyone
should be encouraged to work, but that we think the poor—in particular
blacks and unwed mothers—should be encouraged to work. This singling
out was viewed as insulting because it implied that adequate low-wage work
was available,115 that blacks and single mothers were choosing not to pursue
it,116 and that promiscuity or a lack of family values was the source of this
113. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 20, 901–02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (“[I]t is
not easy to change human behavior. Notwithstanding this fact, the premise of this legislation
is that the behavior of certain adults can be changed by making the lives of their children as
wretched as possible. This is a fearsome assumption. . . . I have pointed out that the princi-
pal—and most principled—opponents of this legislation were conservative social scientists
who for years have argued against liberal nostrums for changing society with the argument
that no one knows enough to mechanistically change society. Typically liberals think other-
wise; to the extent that liberals can be said to think at all.”).
114. This not to say that there might not be some avenue to explain the objection, but it
would have to involve some explanation. Professor Thompson suggests that autonomy con-
cerns generate something like conditional paternalism constraints: if one is to have paternalis-
tic welfare policies, then they should be the least restrictive policies available. Thompson,
supra note 99, at 172 (“Any welfare system based on a paternalistic rationale should begin with
the least restrictive policy on the continuum, and move to more restrictive ones only if they
are necessary to make the system just, and only if they are consistent with the other criteria for
justifiable paternalism.”). Thompson leverages this argument to suggest that paternalism con-
cerns press against in-kind welfare. Id. at 170–72. Perhaps a similar argument could be made
against work requirements.
115. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Breaking of the American
Social Compact 170 (1997) (“Logically, but not in the heated and vitriolic politics created by
the attack on welfare, a concern with the relationship of welfare to dependency should have
directed attention to the deteriorating conditions of the low-wage labor market. After all, if
there were jobs that paid living wages, and if health care and child care were available, a great
many women on [AFDC] would leap at the chance of a better income and a little social
respect.”); Michael D. Tanner, Ending Welfare as We Know It (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis
No. 212, 1994), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa212.pdf (“As
for providing an incentive for recipients to get off welfare, the conservative idea is based on the
stereotyped belief that welfare recipients are essentially lazy, looking for a free ride. But as seen
earlier, the decision to go on welfare is more likely a result of a logical conclusion that welfare
pays better than low-wage work.”).
116. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Neubeck & Noel A. Cazenave, Welfare Racism: Playing
the Race Card Against America’s Poor 139 (2001) (“This welfare ‘dependency’ notion was
built around the racist stereotype that lazy African Americans used welfare to avoid work. . . .
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failure to work.117 In this light, the government wasn’t saying that everyone
should be encouraged to work, but that a discrete group of shirkers should
be encouraged to work. This impression is only heightened by a background
in which middle- and upper-class Americans receive billions of dollars in
government subsidies for mortgage interest, nonprofit endeavors, marriage,
tax-deferred savings, and so on, that do not come with any requirement that
individuals be part of the workforce or engaged in productive activity. Wel-
fare reform singled out a particular group as in need of a strong push toward
the workforce, and it was this singling out that made the paternalism appear
objectionable to critics.
The expressive understanding of paternalism makes clear how the
charge of paternalism harmonizes with the related assertions that welfare
reform was based on hostility toward the poor. If one views paternalism as
simply a matter of intent, then these claims will appear to be polar oppo-
sites. Either the motive was to help the poor, or the motive was one of dis-
gust for the poor. Professors Jordan and McCarty, for example, write that
they seek to “distinguish true paternalistic justifications [for welfare re-
form] . . . against alternative explanations based on racial and gender bias
[or] animus towards the poor.”118 The expressive account of paternalism,
however, suggests that this is a false dichotomy—these are not mutually ex-
clusive ways of understanding government policy. A policy may be “truly
paternalistic,” in the sense that it genuinely aims to improve the well-being
of those affected, and yet still be objectionable because it expresses insulting
attitudes toward racial minorities, women, or the poor. This is the case, at
least in part, because a genuine offer to help can still be insulting when it
singles out a particular group as uniquely in need of that help.
My claim is not that these welfare reform policies were in fact imper-
missibly paternalistic—far more argument would be required to reach that
This stereotype was often linked with yet another racist stereotype, which held that poor Afri-
can-American women bore children to gain or increase their welfare benefits.”).
117. See, e.g., Barbara Ehrenreich, TANF, or “Torture and Abuse of Needy Families”: Top
Ten Misconceptions About TANF, 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 419, 423–24 (2002) (“Many saw (and
still do see) welfare reform as part of a moral crusade; a moral crusade against those evils of
promiscuity, ‘illegitimacy,’ single-mother households, and so on. When you carry out a moral
crusade against female sexuality and female-headed households, you are carrying on a crusade
not just against poor women, but against all single mothers, ultimately against all single
women, and against any woman who happens to be independent-minded. More affluent
women must understand this. The rhetoric that denounces poor women, as the rhetoric
against welfare has continually done, is an attack also on the rights and freedom of all
women.”). Notice how the objection here is framed in terms of the policy’s rhetoric.
118. Stu Jordan & Nolan McCarty, Welfare and Paternalism 4 (Mar. 2, 2010) (work in
progress), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/paternalism9.pdf. For what it’s
worth, it’s not clear that Jordan and McCarty’s model actually tracks genuine paternalism at
all. What it tracks is the benefit each person receives from the fact that other poor people are
working. Id. at 11 (“mc reflects a paternalistic benefit that the individual derives from having
the poor participate in the work requirements and/or submit to other forms of behavioral
regulation.”). In other words, it tracks the way in which increased work among the poor may
be a public good, which has only a tangential relationship with the paternalistic reasons for
endorsing a work requirement.
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conclusion. My claim is simply that the expressive theory of paternalism
provides the resources to understand the charge of paternalism, while other
theories of paternalism do not. Those who find work requirements objec-
tionably paternalistic are reacting not to coercion or to actual legislative in-
tent, but more bluntly to the implicit insult and stigmatization.
G. Unique Aspects of Government Paternalism
Throughout this Article, I have basically treated paternalism as uni-
form—whether it is performed by one’s friend or by the government. But
one might wonder: Isn’t the government different?119 In this Section, I reject
three potential differences between individual and state paternalism, but ac-
knowledge some ways in which government paternalism raises distinctive
concerns.
On some views, there will be an obvious reason to be especially con-
cerned about the government: its coercive power. Following a playoff game,
then Denver Nuggets star Carmelo Anthony remarked, “I’m so much bigger
than my opponent, any nudge, shove, anything like that—I get penalized for
it.”120 The soccer (or here, basketball) theory of paternalism might have a
similar attitude about the government—the sheer amount of force it can
bring to bear means that it is more apt to run us over. That is, if the concern
with paternalism is that it can be coercive, then government paternalism
may seem particularly concerning because the government has so much ca-
pacity for coercion.
But I have argued that what is objectionable about paternalism is not
coercion. If paternalism from the government is more objectionable than
paternalism from a friend, it’s not because the former simply has more coer-
cive power. That would be like thinking that paternalism from powerful
friends is somehow more objectionable than paternalism from weak or inef-
fective friends. Certainly there are general concerns about limiting the role
of government in order to protect individual liberties, but these are not con-
cerns about paternalism—they are concerns about totalitarianism.
A second way that the government might be different is the generality in
which it acts. Because it is bigger, it is also clumsier. When a friend or a
family member acts paternalistically, the intervention may be adapted to the
needs of the person intervened upon. Professor Thompson, for example,
suggests that this is one of the important differences between individual and
government paternalism: “Paternalistic legislation, which applies to an entire
society, cannot easily be tailored to the settled preferences or life plans of
119. Thompson, for example, suggests that the individual model of paternalism can be
misleading when applied to government policies. See Thompson, supra note 99, at 149 (“The
liberal paradigm of paternalism usually presents a relationship between two individuals, who
interact personally for a specific purpose. . . . What the paradigm obscures are two features of
the power that inheres in paternalism—its contestable and systematic character.”).
120. Benjamin Hochman, Jazz Doing Oscar Proud: By Hook or by Crook, Utah’s Players Are
Adept at Drawing Calls for Offensive Fouls, Denver Post, Apr. 23, 2010, at CC1, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/sports/ci_14941562 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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particular individuals.”121 Because legislation is necessarily general, it cannot
possibly be as targeted to specific individuals.122
The generality of government policies is admittedly an important dis-
tinction from private acts of paternalism, but it is not necessarily one that
makes government policy more problematic. In reality, the distinction cuts
both ways. The concern for tailoring is based on a sense that it is important
to adopt the least restrictive alternative.123 Such a concern is warranted if one
maintains that the normatively significant feature of paternalism is the re-
striction of liberty. If, however, the normatively significant feature of pater-
nalism is the expressed respect for those subject to interference, then
generality may actually make an intervention less problematic. A policy that
singles out an individual or group as requiring interference may be substan-
tially more insulting to the singled-out group than would a generalized pol-
icy. If we’re all in it together, then no one is alienated.124
This last observation, however, suggests a third way in which one might
think that government paternalism is necessarily unlike individual paternal-
ism—namely, it lacks the solidarity or reciprocity of individual relation-
ships.125 One might agree that isolated acts of paternalism are permissible in
marriages or friendships, as several of my examples illustrate, but insist that
this is because it goes both ways. I accept that my wife sometimes knows
better what’s good for me in part because I sometimes know better what’s
good for her. Our care for each other and history with each other have, in a
121. Thompson, supra note 99, at 159.
122. See Arneson, supra note 8, at 271 (“To be administratable [sic], laws must be coarse-
grained. The social planner designing laws for a society must reckon with possibilities of mal-
administration and corruption in the implementation of any proposed law by government
agency and with possibilities that the effect of the law on the operation of a society filled with
imperfectly rational, not well-informed, and generally self-interested people will be bad in
ways hard to anticipate. For these familiar reasons, argument about legal paternalism by exam-
ple and counterexample is almost bound to end up uncertain and tentative. Decisive victory
on this terrain is hard to win.”).
123. Thompson explicitly endorses something like this view. See Thompson, supra note
99, at 157 (“[T]he requirement that the constraint on liberty be limited at least entails that
society should choose the least restrictive alternative consistent with the purposes of the
intervention.”).
124. To emphasize a point that has already been made several times, I do deny that re-
stricting citizens’ liberty is a pro tanto reason against a particular policy. All things being
equal, a state should adopt a less restrictive policy. But failure to do so does not, contra
Thompson and other coercion-focused views, necessarily make a policy more objectionably
paternalistic. The individually tailored policy may be less restrictive, and yet more paternalistic.
It is also worth noting that the generality of government policy raises distributive con-
cerns. See Arneson, supra note 8, at 274–76. If any paternalistic government policy were objec-
tionable because it applied to someone who did not need the help, then that would handcuff
the government from providing help to those who do need it. This distributive complexion
provides another reason why generality may make government paternalism less objectionable.
An interference should be less insulting if one knows that it is helping some people who need
it.
125. Cf. White, supra note 34, at 113–19 (arguing that government paternalism is unlike
paternalism among intimates because government cannot care for citizens in the same way).
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sense, built an agreement to trade little bits of paternalism back and forth.
But, the argument goes, our relationship with the government isn’t like that.
The government is paternalistic toward me and I never get to return the
favor. This is why government paternalism is uniquely objectionable—it
comes with an inherent sense of superiority, a unique power dynamic.126
Although this is how many people view their relationship with the gov-
ernment—as a separate authoritarian institution reigning over them—it
probably ought not be that way. If one conceives of a clean divide between
the governing and the governed,127 then there does not appear to be any
reciprocity. If, however, one views the government as a democratic collec-
tion of citizens to which one belongs, then the reciprocity is restored. Some-
times my fellow citizens will band together to advocate and adopt policies
that are paternalistic toward me, and, reciprocally, I too will sometimes join
others in supporting policies that are paternalistic toward other citizens. In
fact, I may even have a hand in being paternalistic toward myself.128 Since
the rules are, in this sense, self-imposed, it may actually be a bit paternalistic
to reject them on grounds of paternalism.129
On this democratic conception, there is a plausible case, I think, that
government paternalism is typically less objectionable than the paternalism
of a friend. There are two reasons why this may be true. First, typical demo-
cratic paternalism will apply to those adopting the policy. A mandatory
seatbelt policy, for example, applies to the very voters and legislators who
adopt it. In this way, democratic paternalism has built into it an important
mitigating factor—the creator of the policy is also subject to the policy.130
Second, the argument from humility is even stronger when one is faced with
a collective judgment. If one person thinks I am making a mistake, I can
more easily dismiss that judgment than if a group of people thinks I am
making a mistake. If an entire social group who I find generally respectful of
my aims and autonomy decides, in a limited circumstance, to act toward me
in a way that implies I do not know what is best for me, it need not be
insulting at all. I’m not infallible. If a whole lot of people think that I’m
126. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 88, at 647 (“State action is not intrinsically more violent
than private. But what makes it seem at least conceivable that the state official should be more
chary of paternalism than the private actor is that the state official acts on people he doesn’t
know, which is just a euphemistic way of saying that he acts on people who belong to class,
racial and sexual groups different from his own.”).
127. See Thompson, supra note 99, at 148, 150 (“Like parents, public officials sometimes
make us act against our own will for our own good. . . . The locus of paternalism refers to the
relationship between those whose liberty is restricted and those who impose the restriction.”).
128. Cf. Husak, supra note 38, at 43–45 (describing paternalism toward oneself as a less
problematic form of paternalism).
129. Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I also share Justice Stevens’s aversion towards
paternalistic governmental policies that prevent men and women from hearing facts that
might not be good for them. On the other hand, it would also be paternalism for us to prevent
the people of the States from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we have good
reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them.”).
130. This mitigating factor is clearly at work in the first smoking example, supra note 37.
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making a mistake, then I should consider taking that seriously. For this rea-
son, discrete policies of even coercive paternalism may be even more likely to
be permissible than acts of interpersonal paternalism, but only if the govern-
ment generally shows respect for the autonomy of its citizens. Context is
key—mere nudges in Stalinist Russia may be objectionably paternalistic,
whereas rare strong pushes in otherwise libertarian Montana might not be.
In other words, the permissibility of a policy will often depend on
whether it coheres with a democratic state-citizen relationship or a hierar-
chical power dynamic between the governing and the governed. If a govern-
ment’s policies express the wholesale inferiority of individual
decisionmaking, then even policies that are not directly coercive may be ob-
jectionably paternalistic. When government policy slides over into expres-
sing a general disrespect for its citizens’ judgment, then it may become
objectionable regardless of whether it is carried out through prohibitions or
nudges. This can happen in a number of ways. One way that this can occur
is through ubiquity. This is why reading Nudge produces a faint suggestion
of Big Brother. The broad suggestion that the government knows best, not
just with regard to a few things, but with regard to practically everything,
can start to feel alienating. Second, even when paternalism is not pervasive,
it may still be objectionable if it touches upon particularly fundamental lib-
erties.131 For example, just nudging people to make particular choices about
things like marriage or pregnancy may seem insulting. Third, as was dis-
cussed in the previous section, paternalism that singles out a particular
group of citizens is particularly liable to be objectionable. Finally, otherwise
reasonable paternalism may seem objectionable when the political process is
opaque and distant from the citizen. Where failures in the political process
undermine the democratic conception of the state, government policy will
start to lack citizen-to-citizen reciprocity.
The broad lesson is that we cannot determine whether any government
policy is objectionably paternalistic in a vacuum. It is likely to depend on an
array of factors: how genuinely democratic the lawmaking process is, how
many other paternalistic policies there are, how universal the application of
the policy is, how those affected by the policy are generally treated, and so
on. Just as determining whether an utterance is insulting requires knowledge
of context, so too will determining whether a particular policy is objectiona-
bly paternalistic. As a result, it may be hard to say if any particular law or
policy is objectionably paternalistic. Although this may be frustrating to
those of us who yearn for theoretical simplicity, I think this more accurately
reflects the reality of disputes about government paternalism. The variability
based on general and extrinsic factors helps explain why debates about pa-
ternalism can seem so intractable, and why different people, faced with the
same law or policy proposal, can have such widely divergent views about
whether it is impermissibly paternalistic.
131. E.g., de Marneffe, supra note 8, at 68 (“Some liberties have a special value in symbol-
izing the status of adulthood within our society, the freedom to marry, for example.”).
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Conclusion
In recent years, the academic literature has seen a microburst of pro-
paternalism arguments.132 This position is considered interesting or innova-
tive (when it is) because we generally assume that paternalism is a bad thing.
But, in order to have a meaningful debate about when paternalism is and is
not appropriate, we need to begin with an understanding of what gives pa-
ternalism its normative character.
I argue that current discussions of paternalism have generally misunder-
stood the answer to this question. Current debates either argue over whether
certain actions are impermissibly coercive or argue over whether it would be
permissible to act with certain intentions. Neither of these questions, I sug-
gest, captures the real concern of those accusing a policy of paternalism. The
focus on coercion is incorrect because more coercive policies can be less
paternalistic, and vice versa. The focus on the reasons for enacting a policy is
incorrect because, in general and especially in the case of paternalism, per-
missibility does not seem to depend on subjective intentions.
I have begun to sketch a third account of when paternalism is permissi-
ble. This account focuses on what is implicitly expressed by an action or
policy. It starts from the idea that paternalistic actions or policies implicitly
express something about the other party, and that this expression can be
disrespectful. In general, being told that one doesn’t know best with regard
to a matter traditionally within one’s control is offensive. The normative
valence of a particular instance of paternalism, however, turns on the same
complex contextual factors that influence whether a particular statement is
wrong or offensive. Thus, paternalism is not always wrong, just as the sen-
tence “I know better than you” is not always an insult. This third way of
thinking about paternalism allows us to make sense of both the de facto
presumption that paternalism is disrespectful and wrong and also the idea
that, in many contexts, paternalism is actually unobjectionable.
Still, this paper admittedly leaves many questions open. I have not at-
tempted to provide precise or complete criteria for when paternalism will be
permissible. My aim instead has merely been to refocus contemporary con-
versations about paternalism. My hope is that, by better understanding what
is wrong with paternalism, we can prevent pro- and antipaternalists from
simply talking past one another.
132. See, e.g., Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism
(2013); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Psychological Defense of Paternalism, in Paternalism: The-
ory and Practice, supra note 31, at 197; Kalle Grill, Anti-paternalism and Invalidation of
Reasons, Pub. Reason, Dec. 2010, at 3; Sunstein, supra note 8.
